


















SO: Sue Onslow (Interviewer) 





SO: This is Dr. Sue Onslow talking to Dr. Hugh Craft in Canberra, on 
Wednesday, 26th March 2014. Hugh, thank you very much indeed for 
agreeing to take part in this project. 
 
HC: My pleasure. 
 
SO: I wonder if you could begin by reflecting, please, on the importance of 
the Commonwealth to Australia. When you first joined the Department 
of Foreign Affairs in 1971, what was the Commonwealth’s value as an 
ideal for Australian diplomats and civil servants? 
 
HC: Well, thank you for coming and thank you for the opportunity to be 
interviewed. We’ve been looking forward to your visit and I’ve been looking 
forward to speaking to you. 
 
 I came to diplomacy from a rather unusual background, which I won’t go into 
now, but it meant that when I joined the Department of Foreign Affairs, as it 
was then, in 1971 – in fact it was the Department of External Affairs – I was 
pretty naïve about huge areas of Australian foreign policy or indeed global 
politics. I think they recruited me for reasons other than my academic 
knowledge of policy. It was at the end of a long period of conservative 
government and, during my early days, the Whitlam Government came to 
power in 1972 and greatly changed the multilateral dimensions of Australian 
policy. Up to that point multilateral policy had been fairly totemic, I think, in 
terms of adherence to the United Nations, membership of the 
Commonwealth, as a very important presence in the South Pacific region, 
and sitting on the edge of whatever happened north of our borders in the 
South East Asian, or North Asian, or even the East Asian/East Pacific areas.  
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Of course, the controlling factors were the relationship with the Americans 
and the NATO Alliance, and the huge amount of post-war consciousness 
about Australia’s continuing relationship with the UK. 
 
 Now, let me say that my awareness of the Commonwealth began really when 
I was at Cambridge. I actually went on a Victoria League visit to London as an 
Australian student. That was a very informal introduction. What I was to learn 
later was that, in the terms of Australian foreign policy, attendance at Heads 
of Government meetings, for example, was seen as pretty much obligatory by 
Australian leaders, but that there wasn’t a great deal of enthusiasm for the 
Commonwealth amongst the bureaucracy. My real introduction came later 
when, on my first posting to Athens, we were covering Cyprus, and there was 
a slight awareness of the Commonwealth’s ongoing position on Cyprus. But 
we were never asked to do anything on Cyprus and the Commonwealth as 
such. 
 
SO: So, were you in Cyprus in 1970…? 
 
HC: ’71 – ’74. We covered Cyprus from Athens. 
 
SO: So, you were there during the Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus? 
That was a ringside seat. 
 
HC: Yes, very much so, and with all the events leading to the fall of the colonels.  
My departure coincided with the return of Karamanlis, and I was in Syntagma 
Square when the millions welcomed him back in August, 1974. 
 
 So, what I’m saying is that, as a general run-of-the-mill diplomat in the 
Australian Foreign Service in 1971, I was not aware of any particular 
commanding interest in the Commonwealth. In fact, I was unaware that 1971 
was the year of the Singapore Declaration – so important in modern 
Commonwealth history. The Commonwealth was not something that was 
brought to our attention as being important in the formulation of Australian 
foreign policy. So, that says something in itself about the consciousness of 
the Australian diplomats, as the priorities of the government were elsewhere.  
 
 My first real contact with the Commonwealth was probably on my next 
posting in Suva [Fiji Islands]. It was a social function where Emeka Anyaoku 
came and charmed the local, totally-white Royal Commonwealth Society 
Branch, and to which I happened to be invited. It was a gathering of the 
remnants of the white colonial society, some of whom were still running key 
parts of the government. Even then it didn’t make much of an impact on me. 
Equally, Emeka didn’t show any interest in me, in particular, either. 
 
SO: Do you know why he was there? 
 
HC: Oh, I think it was part of his normal sort of global rounds. 
 
SO: Peripatetic visitations? 
 
HC: Yes, what senior Commonwealth Secretariat people do. 
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 Then I came back to Canberra in 1974 – out of the blue – as we were 
medically evacuated from Suva with a sick newborn child. We thought that, 
because of her condition, we would be stuck in Canberra for four or five years 
rather than off to another posting in some hot and sticky parts, probably. So 
we were settling down for a long stretch in Canberra, when a call came from 
the Departmental Secretary saying that this job had come up in the 
Commonwealth Secretariat in London and the government was keen to get a 
senior Australian into the job, and would I be interested? He thought that it 
might fit my particular circumstances in not being able to go on postings to 
Third World countries, for example, which were totally ruled out. The best of 
medical facilities would be in London, [and] it would be an interesting and 
important job in the run up to the 1981 Melbourne CHOGM. So, after an 
application and interview, I arrived in Marlborough House and the 
International Affairs Division at the end of 1979. 
 
SO: Hugh, please, if I could just ask you: you made a comment about the 
bureaucrats within the Department of External Affairs not rating the 
Commonwealth particularly highly. But, from ’75 onwards, you had a 
Prime Minister in Malcolm Fraser who really was trying to use the 
Commonwealth as a platform. 
 
HC: That’s right. This is one of the anomalies of policy-making in the foreign 
affairs area. 
 
 Derek Ingram, on behalf of Chief Anyaoko, once did a survey in the 
Commonwealth to do with promotional issues – [i.e.] how the Commonwealth 
could improve its image in Commonwealth countries – and he visited a large 
number of countries, including Australia. Derek concluded that, whereas you 
might have heads of government who were committed and keen to make the 
Commonwealth work, the bureaucracy was almost adamantly opposed to the 
Commonwealth. Later, when I was doing a PhD, I did a similar thing in 
Canberra. I thought I’d test this, and I did a paper. I interviewed 20 or 30 
senior people that I’d known personally who’d been senior in policy-making 
areas, multilateral policy-making, and in Commonwealth countries. So, I 
tested them on this and I wrote what I thought was an interesting paper. It 
was in response to a request from the Round Table for a piece on Australia 
and the Commonwealth. My conclusions were the same as Derek’s. It was 
never published, because whoever refereed it thought it wasn’t good enough 
[laughter]. Editor Andy Williams wasn’t very impressed, because he was keen 
to publish, but there you are.   
 
What I’m saying is that heads of government and bureaucrats can run at 
different paces and, in the case of Fraser, he had a very strong supportive 
back up in his own department – the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet – who ran with the Fraser initiatives and ran very successfully.  The 
Foreign Affairs department – which has always played second place to Prime 
Minister and Cabinet when it comes to heads of government meetings – were 
playing catch-up with PMC the whole time, and not always willingly.   
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SO: So, where is the locus of foreign policy making in Australian politics? 
 
HC: Well, it sits in the Foreign Affairs Department. But on the specific issues of 
interest to Prime Ministers, like CHOGM meetings or G-20, the Prime 
Minister’s department would have a very direct relationship with what the 
Prime Minister wants and set about getting what he wants. It’s changing, and 
foreign affairs has not always been the strong point of our recent Foreign 
Ministers – apart from Kevin Rudd, who used DFAT as an instrument, very 
much his own department.  But, certainly, in the context of the 
Commonwealth and CHOGMs, the international division of the Prime 
Minister’s department has taken the running with DFAT providing a 
supportive role. 
 
SO: I’m just struck by the dichotomy between what you’re saying of the 
attitude of the Department of External Affairs and my knowledge – 
having also interviewed him – of Fraser, who really used the 
Commonwealth as a platform to promote Australia in international 




SO: And Tony Eggleton was encouraging him to do so. 
 
HC: Yes, and there were others there too that were equally supportive, and 
initiatives like the CHOGRM, for example, were run very definitely as a result 
of Fraser’s own personal interest and commitment, and executed by his 
department. 
 
 Foreign Affairs officers were always involved because of missions overseas 
that have to be involved, but the people calling the shots were in the 
international area of PM&C. I can remember being in New Dehli for the 
CHOGRM in 1980 and having a drink with the High Commissioner the night 
before Fraser was due to arrive. His principal advisor from the Prime 
Minister’s Department – the guy running the CHOGRM agenda – was at the 
drinks. I was told by the High Commissioner that the brief had come from 
Canberra, but this guy actually ripped it up, put it in the bin, and re-wrote it for 
Fraser. So, that’s an illustration. I’m not sure it could happen that way these 
days, but then when Fraser was running very hot and strong in the 
Commonwealth that was the disposition of the bureaucrats. 
 
SO: Was that to your advantage – that Fraser was ‘running hot and strong’ 
on the Commonwealth – when you arrived at Marlborough House in 
1979 as Director of Political Affairs? 
 
HC: It was. The Prime Minister’s Department decided they wanted to have an 
Australian in a senior position in the run-up to the Melbourne CHOGM. In fact, 
two Australians out of PM&C had spent several months working with the 
Commonwealth Secretariat in London, getting the message straight as to how 




SO: Because, as I understand it, Fraser’s agenda underlying the 1981 
Melbourne CHOGM was very much economic development. 
 
HC: Yes. It was. 
 
SO: He tried with Michael Manley to set up the Common Fund, having had 
that small meeting at Runaway Bay in Jamaica in 1979. Fraser seems 
really to have been trying to combine West/South economic 
collaboration and developmental issues. How far was this part of [the] 
Department of External Affairs’ agenda at this particular time? 
 
HC: Well, very little I think. Because the whole notion, for example, of CHOGRM, 
was to develop what has since evolved into APEC and the establishment of 
trading and financial links across the region, specifically in respect of 
economic issues. Now, we can talk about that separately, but that was 
Fraser’s emphasis, and it was a very heavy emphasis in Melbourne. He found 
it ran true to the Third World developing agenda, which Sonny Ramphal was 
pressing in the Secretariat, but it didn’t sit comfortably with others like 
Muldoon and Thatcher. But it sat very comfortably in the Commonwealth’s 
broader agenda, which Sonny was pursuing in all sorts of ways – through the 
Brandt Commission and other areas – and of course the whole support for the 
New International Economic Order through the UN. Sonny found a soul mate 
in Fraser and was able to pursue that agenda almost as a sort of personal 
predilection, based on the fact that he knew he had support out there in 
strong Commonwealth figures like Fraser. 
 
SO: If I could go back just to your arrival, then, at Marlborough House in 
1979, with Melbourne scheduled as the next Heads of Government 
Meeting. To what extent, as Director of Political Affairs, were you 
involved in setting that up? Or was that much more the Office of the 
Secretary General? 
 
HC: Well, just a bit of background. I was recruited as Assistant Director and I took 
over as Director in 1982. But, about my recruitment: when I said I would be 
interested in the job, I then went off to London to the interview, crammed on 
the aeroplane on the way there, and did my nervous best in the interview; 
because, frankly, I knew nothing about the Commonwealth.  
 
SO: Like a typical World Bank official reading a country project report! 
 
HC: Yes, that’s right. So, I landed in London and, a bit overwhelmed by the 
magnificent context of Marlborough House, I was interviewed by a panel 
consisting of Chief Emeka Anyaoku, who was Deputy Secretary General and 
the Chair of that selection committee, Moni Malhoutra as the Director of the 
IAD, Peter Snelson [as] Director of the Education Division and Henry Lynch-
Skyllon from Sierra Leone, the Director of the Administration Division. So, it 
was a fairly high-powered committee and I was grilled pretty much by them. 
Andrew Peacock had supported my candidature, which was helpful, I think.  
But I remember very clearly that Moni queried my Anglican theological 
background, wanting to know if I was sound enough politically, regarding – I 
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guess – the multi-faith nature of the Commonwealth. He gave me a real 
grilling. 
 
But, anyway. In the end, they then called me back the next day and asked me 
to come and meet the Secretary General. I had a one-on-one with Sonny, 
and he was obviously checking me out. Moni was there as well. I remember 
one thing Ramphal said. I knew the heavy emphasis of Fraser and himself on 
economics; and Sonny’s own very proactive involvement in international 
economics. I said to him, “Look, I’m sorry, I’m not an economist, and I’m not 
going to be much help to you on all of that stuff”, and he said, “Well, thank 
God for that.” [Laughter] 
 
SO: We need some balance!   
 
HC: That’s right. But, what I’m saying is that the Australian government was very 
committed to getting someone in there. I don’t think they’d had anyone there 
since Michael Wilson – whom you met yesterday, who worked in Arnold 
Smith’s day in the International Affairs Division – and there may have been 
one other, but only for a short time. But, it’s interesting, because in 
succession to Emeka – who’d been an Assistant Director in the International 
Affairs Division in those days, under the Brit, Tom Aston – Emeka became the 
Director. When he became Director, Moni succeeded him as an Assistant… 
He was an Assistant Director, and became Director. Henry Lynch-Schillon 
came at the job very briefly, but was then transported to administration; and 
then that’s when I was recruited to replace Salv Stellini from Malta [who] was 
elevated to Assistant Secretary General, as was Emeka prior to him.   
  
SO: It seems like complicated chess moves within Marlborough House! 
 
HC: But it’s all very interesting because it’s all part of a devised system that meant 
that people with influence found themselves in increasingly important 
positions. So, Emeka became – from the Assisant to Director of International 
Affairs – Assistant Secretary General and then Deputy Secretary General. 
Moni, on the same track, to Assistant Secretary General, but failed to become 
Deputy for all sorts of reasons. 
 
SO: Hugh, please could I ask, is this all part of building the Secretariat as 
silos of strength? There appear to have been relatively autonomous 
departments, with a Secretary General who built up a coterie of people 
around him whom he believed to have particular strengths. I know that 
Sonny Ramphal was quite explicit at head-hunting what he deemed to 
be the best talent, and to make sure that he had his team. This was very 
much Sonny’s management style, and also a key way to proselytizing 
his agenda. 
 
HC: Yes, that’s very much the case. Even more so there were divisions that were 
preferred over others like a hierarchy of divisions, if you like. In the top 
echelon were the International Affairs Division and the Economic Affairs 
Division. There was a proposal at one stage that, as Director of International 
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Affairs, my salary should have a component to reflect the importance of the 
work; the same with Vishnu Persaud, who was doing the economic work. 
That was met with almost industrial action on the part of some of the Division 
heads: others who felt that they were doing an equally-important job, whether 
it be industrial affairs, or management, or agriculture or whatever was going. 
 
SO: Yes. How far did you feel that there was a tension between the Office of 
the Secretary General and the International Affairs Division? 
 
HC: We operated as a wing of the Secretary General’s office, so there was very 
little tension: particularly when Moni became Assistant Secretary General but 
also Head of the Secretary General’s office. Moni held those two positions in 
tandem. When he was Head of International Affairs, he was also increasingly 
the Secretary General’s principal confidante and advisor. When I arrived, he 
was both Head of International Affairs and Head of the Secretary General’s 
office. Mark Robinson and Chris Laidlaw – as was Stuart Mole – ultimately, all 
Assistant Directors in the SG’s office, working under Moni. I didn’t ever find 
there was ever any conflict between what I was mandated to do and what the 
Secretary General wanted, because in those days Moni basically ran them 
both. 
 
SO: Well, he had a prodigious capacity for work.  
 
HC: He had a prodigious capacity. He was a brilliant operator, and not everyone 
got on with him. I did, after an initial eruption, and we worked very happily 
together and very successfully together. I could tell you a myriad of stories 
about how that brought us into conflict with other senior officers in the 
Secretariat, but I chose to put my weight behind Moni – not exclusively, but 
knowing how he reflected the wishes of the Secretary General. I’ll tell you a 
story. The first job Moni got me to do – whilst [I was] settling in with my small 
children in a hotel, looking for a house with all those sorts of things you’ve got 
to do when you go to a new posting – was to write a piece on India and 
Pakistan upon independence, which I knew nothing about at all. But this was 
Moni’s way of testing me. So, within a week, he gave me this assignment. I 
locked myself down and wrote it – with a lot of help from staff and Chatham 
House, I might say – and presented it to him, and it seemed that I got a tick 
for that. 
 
But there did come the time when, because of his ‘interference’ in my role as  
Assistant Director, I had to say to him, “Moni, I’m sorry, I don’t have to be 
here, and I don’t have to be humiliated, which I suspect you’re trying to do. 
I’m prepared to pack up my bags and go back tomorrow to Canberra. I don’t 
need to be here. If you want me to be here, we’ve got to work collaboratively”. 
I knew he was a tough boss. I’ve sat in his office when he called up a 
colleague and, while I was there, tore up his draft and said, “Go back and do 
it again”. This guy later became Foreign Minister in his government. So, Moni 
wasn’t liked by all, but I found him charming, a considerate human being, 
intellectually brilliant, great company and very supportive. 
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SO:  Did he have a problem delegating work or responsibility? 
 
HC: Yes and no. I mean, he delegated everything. I don’t know of anytime that he 
actually said, “Well, that’s yours, I’m not going to…”, or, you know, “I want to 
have control of this”. 
 
SO: Or is this micro-management? 
 
HC: Only in so far he scrutinised absolutely everything in fine detail. He was very 
happy that I had come with first-hand knowledge of the South Pacific. In 
those days in Suva, we’d covered Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and Kiribati as 
well as the regional organisations. I did all the work on that. He was glad to 
have someone to write a paper on the disposition of the multilateral 
organisations in the South Pacific, which became our policy. He left it totally 
to me. He didn’t interfere whatsoever. Other people like Stuart – who worked 
more closely with him next to SG’s office – might have felt a bit restricted, 
because he protected his relationship with Sonny very closely. 
 
SO: If I could take you back to the CHOGMS, the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meetings. Did you attend Melbourne? 
 
HC: Yes, as an Assistant Director. It was my first CHOGM.   
 
SO: Malcolm Fraser commented that the background demonstrations by 
Aboriginal human rights activists was an important part of the setting, 
because his hope [was] that the news story at Melbourne would be 
economic/developmental consensual issues and there was this aspect 
of Australian domestic politics which intruded. Does that accord with 
your memories of it? 
 
HC: Not really, no. I’m sure as Prime Minister it probably preoccupied him. I’m 
sorry, I can’t really give you a comment on that because I don’t recall other 
than it being one factor that was happening. That wasn’t the thing that was 
preoccupying me. I was an Assistant Director, Moni was Director. The two 
things that happened at that meeting which were really memorable – apart 
from lots of interesting policy stuff that came out of the meeting which had 
long-term implications – was the conflict between the Secretariat and the 
Australian officials about the conduct of the meeting, the shape and size of 
rooms, and the importance of getting it right, for the Commonwealth way of 
doing things. 
 
SO: What, ‘in the round’, rather than theatre-style…? 
 
HC: Well, no, in the way the rooms were set up. Australia had spent a lot of 
money on the Exhibition Centre that meant they had to rebuild it. It wasn’t just 
to do with the size and shape of rooms, but who was running the meeting, 
basically, and the Secretariat people – and I’m thinking of Moni in 
particular…I don’t remember much about what Emeka was doing in those 
days, but Moni, he used to carry the can for the Secretariat in these sort of 
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discussions with Australia. The second thing I remember was my introduction 
to Commonwealth drafting, because, you know, there’s a huge amount of 
drafting that goes on by the Secretariat, in and around CHOGMS, and in 
particular the communiqué. Sitting around the table late at night, very late at 
night, with Sonny and Moni. Again, I can’t remember Emeka being there, but I 
do remember Mark Robinson playing a great role in the choice of wording, 
getting the words and phraseology right, which was very important to 
Ramphal, because he’d pick it up and walk it around to Heads of Government 
– that was his style – and get things moving. 
 
The third thing was really on the policy side, where a lot of things were 
initiated in Melbourne, including the Small States Programme. It wasn’t 
heralded as such, but the Australian government moved in behind proposals 
to reinforce the capacity of small states – particularly in the Pacific – to have a 
meaningful voice within the Commonwealth, and the possibility of 
representation in the UN. 
 
SO: That really came out of the first CHOGRM meeting in Sydney in May 
1979, when Malcolm Fraser had commented that he felt that this was 
entirely appropriate, because small Pacific island states felt remarkably 
reticent at speaking out at these increasingly large Commonwealth 
meetings, and they needed a smaller venue. 
 
HC: Absolutely right. But it took root and evolved over a number years – mainly 
through the work of people like Chris Laidlaw and Ed Dommen in the UN 
system, who had begun putting papers together with the support of Sonny. 
These were the proposals that were floated initially at Kingston. But it did 
begin to pick up pace through 1980-81, and ended up with Australia coming 
up with the money to put together the New York office for small states. 
 
SO: So, it was Australian money to do that? 
 
HC: Australian money, yes. 
 
SO:  Was this intended as capacity-building for small states, to have that 
permanent presence in New York… 
 
HC: Amazing. Yes. Well, it was IAD which covered all the arrangements on that 
when I was head of the division: including negotiations with the UN, who 
didn’t want it. 
 
SO: Did they not? 
 
HC: No, they didn’t; certainly didn’t. 
 
SO: Why wouldn’t they assist you? 
 
HC: Well, because the UN concept of membership was not only related to states 
possessing political independence/autonomy and the capacity to pay fees 
upfront, but also that they possess an individual physical identity in New York. 
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A combined office – embracing a number of separate states – weakened that 
notion. 
 
SO: Why?   
 
HC: So, we had to negotiate this concept through the UN system, which wasn’t 
easy, mainly because it was so novel. And we had to negotiate the physical 
arrangements with landlords on contracts [and] with builders on the 
construction. As you can imagine, we spent a lot of time with New York 
lawyers. Not forgetting potential participating governments and the broader 
Commonwealth constituency. All that was set up during my time: I think, 
involving five or six missions. Remarkable success. I don’t know if you’ve 
been to it, but it still sits on Second Avenue somewhere and I think now 
houses about 12 missions. Remarkable. That was with Australian money – at 
Malcolm Fraser’s [initiative] – and then it was broadened to a more solid 
funding support. Politically, it was given more point and purpose by the Small 
States Initiative coming out of Delhi in 1983. 
 
SO: What other particular policy initiatives do you recall coming out of 
Melbourne that had lasting significance, in addition to the Small States 
programme? 
 
HC: Well, it was the first meeting with Mugabe there. Mugabe was there, Pierre 
Trudeau, Mrs. Gandhi, [and] Thatcher. Muldoon, playing a mischievous role. 
No Michael Manley, but Maurice Bishop was there and the usual line-up of 
very interesting figures. The range of outcomes that came out on the political 
and economic front – the Small States issue, the consolidation of the African 
wing with, if you like, the celebration of Zimbabwe – all of which seemed to 
give the Commonwealth a sense of real relevance and importance. 
 
SO: A Commonwealth triumph. 
 
HC: Exactly. And Mugabe was good in those days. People like Lee Kwan Yew, 
Kenneth Kaunda, Julius Nyerere and Tupula Effi from Samoa, representing a 
breed of new and interesting leaders. 
 
SO: So, [at] this particular point then, in 1981, the Commonwealth appeared 
to have development and economics as one of its grand strategies? 
 
HC: Yes. Yes, it did. 
 
SO: Okay, when did that start to dissipate?   
 
HC: Well, John Eyres didn’t cover this extensively the other day [at the COHP 
Witness Seminar, 24 June 2013], but the principal earlier role of the 
Commonwealth in economics was to set itself up as a repository of 
information about international economic developments that would assist 
member states in their own internal economic development, as well as in their 
posture internationally. 
 
SO: So, again it was capacity building? 
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HC: Capacity building, absolutely. Yes. And this was built upon – in later years – 
by the Technical Assistance Group (TAG), which moved into Commonwealth 
countries and gave them expert support in negotiating and in capacity 
building: for example, in providing computerised systems so they could 
access the information themselves. And particularly in places like Papua New 
Guinea and Bougainville, where the TAG people – Roland Brown, a 
renowned international lawyer, and Professor Michael Faber, who had been 
the head of development studies at Sussex University – they actually 
provided the negotiating team to stand behind the Papua New Guinea 
Government in negotiating the original Bougainville Agreement on its copper 
assets. 
 
            So, the Melbourne meeting gave a huge boost to the Ramphal 
political/economic agenda. It was to build upon a role focused on the 
provision of economic and statistical information to newly-established 
independent ex-colonies. This had been a function initially undertaken by the 
UK that had even preceded the establishment of the Secretariat in 1965 and 
expanded in Arnold Smith’s day. Now it was to align Ramphal, the Secretariat 
and the Commonwealth with the global international developmental agenda. 
 
SO: Not development, aid and planning? 
 
HC: It was the heyday when Ramphal, with the partial blessing of Commonwealth 
Heads of Government, became so heavily involved in the international 
commissions – particularly in the Brandt Commission – and everything that 
surrounded those eminent people, whose ideas were pretty much dismissed 
in the early days but in later years became very much accepted as 
international policy in the UN. You’ve got to remember that the Ramphal 
policy stated and re-stated, time and time again, was – and it’s absolutely true 
– that “the Commonwealth cannot negotiate for the world, but can help the 
world to negotiate”. And that’s a very smart summary of, really, what his view 
[was] of how we could work. We cannot actually institute a new economic 
international order, but we can provide viable intellectual input to global 
negotiations on things coming from a group of 50 plus Commonwealth 
countries. So, you’ll notice all of those Declarations that came through – in the 
‘80s, for example – were aimed at emboldening the aspirations of the 
international community. For example: in Nassau, while leaders did all that 
work on apartheid and the Commonwealth’s call on Southern Africa, they 
were offering their support to World Order on the 40th anniversary of the 
United Nations.  
 
SO: Sir Peter Marshall made reference to this in his interview: that the 
United Nations was unable to come up with an agreement on this 
particular declaration – to mark the anniversary – and yet you managed 
to draft it down in Nassau. 
 
HC: Yes, we actually carried it to New York after Nassau, picked up the 
declaration and took it to talk to the UN people about it. So, it was that sort of 
thing that Ramphal did and did very well, and I think that his strength was in 
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his genuine personal interest and commitment to that diplomatic approach: 
his capacity to grasp the nub of the issues, and his readiness to use people 
like Peter Marshall – real, respected professionals who knew their way 
around multilateral diplomacy. 
 
SO: Not only did they know the ropes, they knew the people… 
 
HC: They knew the people, correct. 
 
SO: They were phenomenally well-placed in the networks. Peter Marshall 
emphasised not only that he knew the world of New York, but he also 
knew the world of Washington, and he knew the world of Geneva. 
 
HC: Yes, that’s right. 
 
SO: So, his particular appointment as Deputy Secretary General Economic 
was enormously important. 
 
HC: Absolutely, it was, and he was a diplomat – a true diplomat. He understood 
the diplomatic world. 
 
SO: A diplomat, and his relationship with Number 10 as well. 
 
HC: That’s right. But, you see, it was always going to be pedestrian after Sonny. 
Emeka was always going to be pedestrian. He had his own qualities, but he 
didn’t have the flair and the political insights. I don’t want to be critical of 
Emeka, but that’s just the case. 
 
SO: I’d just also like to suggest that this was the context of the Cold War, but 
it’s also the context of decolonisation, state transition and nation state 
building; and, therefore, there was a coherence of emerging state 
agendas – particularly in the African states, although not exclusively, 
also in the Pacific Island states – of needing to build state capacity, of 
accelerating their economic and human development. So there were, if 
you like, the components of a collaborative exercise. They also shared 
the problems of their asymmetrical economic power relations, their 
developmental agenda in a context of an international political 
economy, which was not shaped according to their needs. So, the 
Commonwealth had a coherence and identity with that. 
 
HC: And it accorded with its original role as a handmaiden to the emergence of 
newly independent states, particularly in Africa which was like a flood 
descending on the world in those early days. That’s where Arnold Smith and 
Sonny were very good. And Emeka, to give him his credit, proved himself 
over and again in dealing with the Africans as they emerged to independence 
and in interpreting their views.The role of the Secretariat was deliberately 
tailored to accommodate its member states in a way which aided economic 
development, gave them a status in the world, gave them an international 
voice at Heads of Government level – which also provided a vehicle to pursue 
their collective international interests, like in Southern Africa. It gave even the 
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smallest of them a voice in shaping policy that ultimately did have some sort 
of impact on wider global developments. That was a deliberate policy in the 
‘70s and the ‘80s.  In the ‘90s, the world changed, and Anyaoku was dealing 
with a different world: a world that was giving increasing importance to good 
governance and democratic government. The Commonwealth under 
Anyaoku’s leadership made a huge contribution to a global position on 
democracy as a normative expectation in responsible societies. 
 
Jon Sheppard said the other day that he led 13 Commonwealth observer 
missions. In my day, we had Zimbabwe, and later we went off to Uganda – 
both in 1980. For all sorts of reasons, it came to a stop after Uganda. 
 
SO: I’ve read Commonwealth Secretariat files on the Ugandan election. That 
was really quite a hairy election observer mission. 
 
HC: Well, I was up to my eyeballs in that exercise and shared a room with Raja 
Gomez, in that dreadful hotel in Kampala: ‘The Speke’, as it was in those 
days. That was really a hairy mission. 
 
SO: The violence that was going on in the ground... 
 
HC: It was occurring right outside our front door. Secretariat staff were scattered 
in the field. I didn’t go to the rural areas, being in the central group – the core 
group – which included Patsy Robertson, Moni Malhoutra, Jeremy Pope, and 
Raja Gomez. We were the core people, but we had people all over Uganda in 
dreadful situations. Yes, that was really, really a difficult one. Violent? Yes, in 
the extreme. I vividly remember leader Museveni surrounded by his AK47-
bearing bodyguards, straight out of the jungle, coming into the Speke to see 
the COG [At the time Museveni was Defence Minister in the Military 
Commission for the interim coalition government, tasked with routing Idi 
Amin’s troops.]. Do you want to talk about that? 
 
SO: Yes, I would like to. Was it because Zimbabwe had been such a 
success, which encouraged the replication in Uganda? 
 
 But, if I could just go back to the Commonwealth Heads of Government 
meetings. You mentioned Small States and obviously the New Delhi 
meeting where the Small State issue was under the spotlight…because 
of the American invasion of Grenada which had taken place three weeks 
beforehand. Do you recall the intensity of feeling? 
 
HC: I do, very much so, yes. I was Conference Secretary in New Delhi sitting in all 
the meetings. I didn’t go to the retreat, but was in on all the key meetings. 
Feelings ran very high, and Bob Hawke – when you see him tomorrow – will 
relate to you the tensions of that meeting. They overflowed out of that into 





HC: Rather nasty exchange with – well, nasty on his part – with Indira Gandhi on 
the Middle East paras in the draft communiqué. That was very unfortunate, 
and that’s one of my enduring memories of that meeting. 
 
SO: Indira Gandhi had hosted the Non-Aligned Movement meeting in March 
of that year, as well as the Commonwealth Heads of Government 
meeting in the October. It would seem that the overriding agenda of 
India at that particular point was to try to be a soothing factor in high 
politics: particularly because what came out was the Goa Declaration on 
International Security. I know that Trudeau was on his way to visit 
Moscow immediately after the Delhi CHOGM. 
 
HC: Yes, the Trudeau initiative. 
 
SO: The Trudeau initiative to try to re-inject some energy and dynamism in 
the START negotiations. So, the background of this Commonwealth 
meeting was very much the Cold War and [the] nuclear arms race. Is 
that your recollection? 
 
HC: That’s true. Trudeau got very little support out of the Commonwealth for that. 
 
SO: Oh? That’s not what Patsy said, as Commonwealth Information officer, 
to The Sydney Times?  
 
HC: Oh, well my recollection is that he didn’t get a lot of support. Trudeau certainly 
stirred a lot of press interest and a flurry in the multilateral community. The 
formal reception in the executive meetings was supportive but cool. In any 
event, the initiative went nowhere in the end.   
 
SO: That’s interesting. 
 
HC: There were three things, really, that came out of that meeting in my memory. 
One was the Middle East paragraphs – where officials had agreed to a line 
that Hawke discovered overnight and that he didn’t agree with. So, he had to 
press for a change in the final executive meeting. And quite apart from the 
procedural matter of altering what had been already been agreed, Hawke had 
a very decided pro-Israel view – always has had – [and] was very quite rude 
with her [Indira Gandhi] in expressing it. Rude in the way that only Hawke 
could probably be. But that was very embarrassing among fellow leaders and 
a setback to Australian/Indian bilateral relations. In later years, I think, Hawke 
tried to make up for that by his very, very close relations with Rajiv [Gandhi]. 
But that was a very sour note and she, of course, was gracious about it to the 
very end. The second thing was the small states debate that – as you know, 
without going into the details now – had caused divisions right through the 
Commonwealth, even with Mrs. Thatcher and Reagan. And Sonny Ramphal’s 
article in the latest Round Table, I think, is very enlightening here. 
 
This is where the various silos in the Secretariat were happening. I mean, 
Neville Linton was working for me then and he knew the situation very well.  
I’ve seen the reference to Neville going to Grenada, I don’t recall that. But 
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Neville – because of his regional expertise, and this was Sonny’s way of 
doing things – was involved in all of the discussions. A bit of a leg man in all 
of this. 
 
SO: Well, that was entirely appropriate, as he is from the Caribbean. 
 
HC: And it’s the way it should be. So, as I said, Sonny had his own way of dealing 
with these things and would pick people to do things for him – especially    
when it came to the Heads of Government Meetings and the discussions 
there. We were all involved, but Sonny’s diplomatic method was one thing 
that struck me very clearly. Of course, the Delhi decision to create an Expert 
Group on Small States was very good, and the report ultimately became 
seminal and historic. It’s one of the important documents of the time. I 
remember John Compton’s words – and it has always stuck in my mind – 
when he said that what had happened in Grenada could happen in his own 
country [St. Vincent], a small island state, if half a dozen people with 
automatic weapons were to confine the Prime Minister to his residence, take 
control of the broadcasting system and the control tower at the airport. That 
was all that was needed to take over the country without blood being shed. 
 
SO: Because small islands had police forces, but they hadn’t got the arms or 
training to deal with insurrection? 
 
HC: That’s right. They are vulnerable on many levels. Compton’s intervention was 
very perceptive and powerful and prescient. For, lo and behold, prior to the 
Vancouver Heads of Government meeting – after we’d dealt with the 
Vulnerability Report that highlighted the vulnerability of small states – leaders 
were confronted with, Fiji where exactly that had happened. Rabuka with his 
rifles had walked into the parliament and taken over the country. So, it was 
not only relevant to what had happened in retrospect in Grenada, it actually 
became an agenda-shaping issue for the Commonwealth – despite the fact 
that, in Delhi, there were these conflicting views seriously impacting on the 
meeting. But what came out of it was a brilliant piece of diplomatic 
marksmanship by the Commonwealth in producing the Vulnerability Report 
and in anticipating a debate that would evolve in subsequent years. 
 
SO: So, at New Delhi the issue was Grenada. At the next CHOGM, at Nassau 
in 1985, the issue of sanctions was starting to ratchet further up the 
scale. Sonny had made a public statement, which was reported in the 
press, supporting the issue of sanctions earlier in the year and so 
putting down a marker. It is very much part of the folklore that Mrs. 
Thatcher was deeply antagonistic to the Commonwealth at this 
particular point – on the question of sanctions. Does that accord with 
your…? 
 
HC: Well, yes and no. I’ll be interested to hear what you say tonight, but I was 
privileged, I guess, to be sitting on the edge of all this as Head of the Political 
Division in that whole period leading up to Nassau. There were a number of 
key factors: the deterioration of things in South Africa and the intransigence of 
P W Botha, the increasing volatility in the region, the American position on 
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‘constructive engagement’, and the heightened and precarious position of the 
Front Line States – in particular Zambia and Zimbabwe – and their security 
needs in the face of the spread of apartheid. It became an issue that really 
just absorbed, almost, the total energy of the Commonwealth. I can 
remember hour after hour being spent in the Commonwealth Committee on 
Southern Africa – of which I was secretary – and the Brits were fending off the 
increasingly strident position of the rest of the Commonwealth. In this context, 
I give great tribute to Moses Anafu, who was our principal advisor on 
Southern Africa – the officer in my division that worked on Southern Africa. 
His work on those preparatory papers over the the nine years I was there – 
and before and beyond – was absolutely remarkable in my view. 
 
But the British position, reflecting Margaret Thatcher’s position, was to stall 
any move against the South African government and to promote the reform of 
the system – not to eradicate apartheid. I’m interested to see – [as] 
acknowledged in Anyaoku’s writings – that there was a softer side, if you like, 
to the Thatcher position. It wasn’t as if she personally was in support of 
apartheid. I think there’s sufficient evidence on the record, particularly if you 
go into the Heads of Government meetings, to see that she really didn’t like P 
W Botha and she didn’t like what was happening in South Africa. She was 
certainly beholden to pro-apartheid elements in her party and government 
and it would be interesting to see what sort of advice she was getting from the 
UK mission in South Africa. But I think that varied over time as well. I 
remember reading somewhere some time that she was surprised that Peter 
Jay was more accommodating to her position on South Africa than some of 
the other professional diplomats. But, there’s no question that, in these 
meetings – including the post- EPG review meeting in London – where she 
was just one of six or seven around the table, that she held out to a 
remarkable extent on the position that enunciated the need to secure the 
future of South Africa economically and in a way that didn’t damage the 
totality of the South African people, the black population. Adopting sanctions 
does tend, in the international community, to become an easy, formulaic way 
of solving problems in a non-military way. But it isn’t, really. It is an 
instrument, but it’s not the only instrument; it’s got to sit alongside all sorts of 
other initiatives. 
 
SO: Well, indeed. In fact, I’m going to make reference this evening to the 
open letter that General Obasanjo wrote to Thatcher after the EPG visit 
and after the review meeting in London in 1986, setting out his sense of 
moral outrage and his demand that Thatcher acknowledge that – if she 
was going to use sanctions against Argentina, against Chile, using them 
against Eastern Europe at that particular time – that there was a moral 
imperative to use sanctions again as a diplomatic demonstration of 
repugnance against the apartheid system. Obasanjo’s sense of distress 
and anger really radiates off the text of this letter. It’s a very, very 
powerful appeal to Thatcher. Yet, as you say, she didn’t see that 
sanctions, indeed, would be helpful in the longer run. 
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HC: That meeting in London was very interesting: sitting around a small table like 
this, just six or seven people there, chaired by Pindling of the Bahamas. 
There were very few people in the room. I was privileged to be there as one 
of the very few officials with responsibilities for arranging and recording the 
meeting. Mrs Thatcher was subject to an onslaught, and one saw at first hand 
how she had acquired this reputation for resilience and stubbornness. And, 
like her enemies, one had to admire her for her tenacity. So, while finding her 
policy on apartheid repugnant and her diplomatic skills sadly wanting, I could 
see the rationality in her position as it stood in great contrast to the highly-
charged and determined position adopted by the Commonwealth, generally. I 
think that she wanted it believed that she wasn’t prepared to give any quarter 
to apartheid and to the system. These concerns were being overturned by her 
seeking to protect wider UK interests. At that meeting, there were Mulroney, 
Hawke, Rajiv Gandhi, Kaunda, Mugabe, Thatcher and Pindling, and the 
Secretary-General, Ramphal, sitting at the table. I remember so clearly. It 
was like friends sitting around the table, making a last ditch appeal to one of 
their number who was being recalcitrant and petulant. Hawke and Mulroney 
delivered the most emotional and personal reflections on their experience of 
racism. I thought Hawke was a bit made up, if you like, but Mulroney was 
absolutely brilliant – and, you’d think, how could anybody stand against this 
personal appeal? Rajiv Gandhi was absolutely superb: modest, thoughtful, 
gracious and compelling, and Thatcher obviously took more notice of him 
than anybody around this table. 
 
SO: Why?   
 
HC: Well, because she liked him, I think. I think she felt desperately sorry at what 
happened with his mother. 
 
SO: With whom she got on very well. 
 
HC: Yes, that’s right, and Rajiv Gandhi was such a gentleman. I’ll tell you a story 
in a moment, if you want a little anecdote. Such a gentleman: when he spoke, 
she was obviously listening. I don’t think it was just personal liking or the fact 
that she felt the loss of his mother; but I think she recognised in him a 
statesman that would see good sense and not be personally carried away 
with the emotional importance of sanctions. But, let me give you the story. At 
the subsequent Vancouver CHOGM, the South African debate, of course, 
was intense. It was after that meeting that she [Thatcher] said she was only 
giving up “teeny weeny” ground on sanctions. 
 
SO: She gave in a teeny tiny little bit… 
 
HC: A teeny, tiny bit. And then she’s going on to talk about the ANC as terrorists 
and things like that. 
 
SO: That comment about the ANC as a “typical terrorist organisation” was at 
Vancouver, yes. 
 
HC: Yes, that’s Vancouver. 
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SO: “Typical terrorist organisation” was how she described the ANC – in 
response to a question from a journalist on the ANC announcement 
[that], if British companies were going to deal in South Africa, they were 
legitimate targets. She said, “Well, in that case, it’s a typical…”  
 
HC: Well, you see, at the conclusion of Vancouver, Hawke and Mulroney called 
that press conference which was obviously to rub it into Thatcher. I got this 
urgent call from Patsy Robertson, the Director of Public Affairs, saying, 
“You’ve got to get down here to the press conference, you’ve got to listen to 
this”. In fact, she said, “I want you sitting up there on the platform with me, co-
chairing the press conference. I want the head of the Political Division to be 
there to answer questions”. 
 
 But, to finish the anecdote. At that meeting, the discussion of Southern Africa 
proceeded in a pretty predictable way, with the Africans being very strong and 
insistent on strong measures being adopted. Getting towards the end of the 
debate… As Conference Secretary, I sat in the room directly behind the row 
of two seats and the SG at the table. I first had a visit from [the] UK Foreign 
Secretary, Geoffrey Howe, who was sitting behind Mrs.Thatcher, and he said, 
“Hugh, Mrs. T would like to be the last speaker before the lunch and 
adjournment”, and I said, “Fine”, and I conveyed that message to Sonny, 
sitting beside the Chairman, Brian Mulroney. 
 
Shortly after that, Natwar Singh, the Indian Foreign Minister, came to me and 
said, “Hugh, Rajiv would like to be the last speaker in this debate”, so I said, 
“Fine”, and passed that on to Sonny, and I said, “Well, we will need to talk to 
Geoffrey Howe”, and things like that. Anyway, both Ministers got into the 
corner – Howe with Robert Armstrong, Natwar Singh with a senior Indian 
official – to work out who would say what and when. Nothing was resolved. 
When it came to the very end of the debate, Brian Mulroney cleverly said, 
“Look friends, we’re coming to the end of this discussion. I’ve got two 
speakers on my list: Rajiv and Margaret. Who’s going to be first?” Rajiv said, 
“Well Mr. Chairman, in my country, in my government, chivalry is still very 




 Mulroney said, “Over to you, Margaret”. And, as sharp as a rapier, Margaret 
Thatcher said, “Mr. Chairman, thank you Rajiv. But in my country, and in my 










HC: But, a nice little touch and playing on the friendship and the admiration both 
had for one another. At the same time, she was going to have the last word.  
Of course, she won. After the London review meeting, the British exception 
clause would always work into the communiqués: and so it happened in 
Vancouver. 
 
SO: I’ve talked to Stuart [Mole] about this. I’ve argued [that] the South 
Africans had a particular regard for Thatcher because they felt that she 
was one of the few remaining friends of South Africa – not of the 
apartheid regime, but of South Africa – and so she helped keep lines of 
communication open when they were increasingly embattled, having 
painted themselves in a corner. And Stuart’s reflection was that she 
failed to understand the sense of moral repugnance towards apartheid, 
and that she gave the impression that she genuinely didn’t appreciate 
quite how appalling the situation was in South Africa – the living 
conditions, the squalor that was all too common among the black 
communities. And his implicit suggestion was that she could have 
played it better while still remaining, shall we say, true to her intellectual 
beliefs. 
 
HC: I respect that view of Stuart’s – and there is probably some truth in it – but I’m 
not sure how she could have done that. As the EPG’s opening sentence said, 
“Nothing could have prepared us…” I think you’ve got to take three things 
together, probably, in assessing Thatcher on South Africa, apartheid, or the 
Southern Africa context. You must take into account the distance she had 
travelled on Zimbabwe and what that meant. I understood that her position on 
Zimbabwe was, “Look, we’ve held the hands of all of these African states and 
we’ve helped them happily to democracy and independence and autonomy. 
What did we do right in respect of all the others that we’ve done wrong on 
Southern Rhodesia?” And there are instructions to officials: “Get it right on 
Zimbabwe, you know, tell me what we can do to get it right on Zimbabwe”. 
Now, that’s an over-simplification of the case, but I think that what she was 
driving at was, eventually, that there should be this major British initiative to 
convene what became the Lancaster House discussions.   
 
So, she travelled a huge way on that – particularly when you go back to the 
discussions she had in Australia before she became Prime Minister, when 
she put herself so badly off-side with Malcolm Fraser. And, you could say that 
she wasn’t aware on Zimbabwe – or, she was aware, depending on what 
position you take on Thatcher. She was aware of all the killings and the 
dreadful conditions that the Smith Regime perpetrated on the African 
population. I don’t think there’s any way that she wasn’t aware of what was 
happening there; and there was no way that she wasn’t aware of what was 
happening in South Africa. Everyone knew the appalling state of the 
townships. Everyone knew the role of the South African military. Everyone 
knew the cries of anguish from Tutu and the leaders – Allan Boesak and all of 
those good people, the Black Sash movement. People knew about that. The 
Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa meetings in London were 
replete with that sort of information. We majored on getting that sort of 
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accurate data to put before the committee, from a whole range of sources, 
and confronting the British with it. She knew about it.   
 
So, something else was driving her, and I think it was the fact that here is an 
industrial state that’s been created – that is the most powerful industrial state 
in Africa – and they’re doing pretty well. The way of life that they’re 
promoting…if only that could spill over into the general populace, then things 
would be better in South Africa. And part of that was getting rid of apartheid, 
but getting a responsible black regime in power. And that wasn’t the ANC, 
because they were terrorists. In my view, that was the position that seemed to 
be moulding the British approach to all of this. 
 
SO: And, of course, the British were aware by this time that the South 
Africans had developed nuclear capability. 
 
HC: Yes, that’s right. 
 
SO: And that this was a powerful state – the leadership of which was 
increasingly adopting a laager mentality, so… 
 
HC: And, the third thing is retrospective and asks – in the light of governance 
problems in post-colonial Africa – whether she was right to be cautious on 
some of these things. When you look at what’s happened, for example, in 
Zimbabwe… 
 
SO: Did you know, at the time, in the Secretariat, about the Gukuruhundi 
killings in Zimbabwe between ’82 and ’85? 
 
HC: You know, no. Well, not as much as we should’ve known, and I feel very 
badly about that. Stephen Chan will probably have a view on this, because he 
was based in Bulawayo for the observer group. I was based in Fort Victoria, 
which is now Masvingo, and I saw enough of what was going on in my area. 
No, we didn’t; and it’s always puzzled me why. I guess it somehow dropped 
below the radar and was not really a major focus of our attention, because we 
were so enamoured by Mugabe.   
 
SO: Well, he was the Commonwealth’s success story. 
 
HC: We were so mesmerised by him. 
 
SO: I remember talking to Margaret Ling, who, of course, had been a leading 
member of the Anti-Apartheid Movement and IDAF in London. She 
became very emotional – understandably – when we were reflecting on 
the Gukuruhundi Campaign and what that meant for compromised 
transition in Zimbabwe, post-independence. I wondered whether there 
was a case for an assumption that this was South African subversion – 
support for Super-ZAPU, the extent to which it may have been assumed 
to be misreporting – and a resistance to believe what could have been 
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happening, precisely because it was against the narrative of a 
successful transition.  
 
HC: Exactly. A bit of both, but the latter predominantly, I think. I encountered 
South African incursions into Zimbabwe when I was in Masvingo. I and my 
ComSec companion, Ned Amarasinghe, could have been killed. His brother, 
Shirley Amarasinghe, was the great advocate of the Law of the Sea – as Sri 
Lankan Ambassador to [the] UN [in] New York. Ned, a former businessman, 
worked in the Secretariat in a fairly lowly position. [He] subsequently passed 
away.  
 
I went to Zimbabwe almost immediately after I joined the Secretariat. It was 
when the Lancaster House discussions had concluded and they’d moved 
across to Marlborough House to sort out the details. That’s when I arrived at 
the Secretariat as an Assistant Director IAD and almost immediately whipped 
off to Zimbabwe for the elections. 
  
 I was deployed in Masvingo – or the Fort Victoria, as it was then – which was 
probably the most active in terms of warfare, because it went right down to 
the Mozambique border on one side and the South African border on the 
other, so it was very interesting. On this particular day, I went to the election 
rally at which Robert Mugabe was to speak, and I guess I must have been the 
only white man in sight in this huge arena, enveloped in dust with [a] mass of 
excited people doing traditional dancing. Mugabe arrived in great splendour 
and gave a very rousing speech. He was certainly charismatic, and the whole 
place was bursting at the seams. I had to leave the rally about three quarters 
of the way through the speech because my companion, Ned Amarasinghe, 
was arriving at the airport. So, I drove there about half an hour out of town. 
Having picked up Ned, on our way back to town, we passed the Mugabe 
cavalcade about five minutes from the airport. Momentarily, after we passed, 
there was an explosion. 
 
SO: Yes, it was the attack on his life, yes. 
 
HC: Yes. A bomb had been planted in a culvert by the Selous Scouts who were 
out in the bush there somewhere. Ned and I had driven across this bloody 
culvert… [Laughter] 
 
SO: You’d driven across it?! 
 
HC: Well, yes, we were coming back as they were going – Mugabe and his 
motorcade, travelling at great speed to the airport, and…boom! An explosive 
in a culvert under the road: planted and detonated, as [was] established later, 
by the Rhodesian military [Selous Scouts]. So, that was a close shave. You 
know, you put your life on the line with the Secretariat in these situations! 
There was no doubt in my mind that all our electoral activity throughout this 
region – including the couple of assembly points in our area –  was all being 
monitored by the South African military. And I’ve got no doubt that it 
happened later in Bulawayo and in Matabeleland. But throughout the ensuing 
decade we did tend to give Mugabe the benefit of the doubt. I travelled with 
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Obasanjo after the Eminent Persons Group on the security exercise Sonny 
set up... Have I got that listed? 
 
SO: Yes, you do. You were part of the Senior Member Secretariat Support 
Team in South Africa at the EPG, Southern Africa. I know that you 
toured the region with Obasanjo. You also went to Botswana, in addition 
to going up to Lusaka. 
 
HC: Yes, and then into Tanzania and Mozambique – looking into the security 
needs of the Front Line States. We were in a Nigerian military aircraft and 
Moses Anafu and my PA [Pindra Kaur] made up the team. 
 
SO: So, police training… 
 
HC: And military equipment. And we then went off to Lagos to write the report and 
that was looking specifically at what their needs were to counter South 
African aggression. 
 
SO: Yes. You list Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana. 
 
HC: We didn’t go to Angola on that occasion, but Mozambique, yes. No, that was 
very hairy too. This was soon after Machel’s aircraft had been shot down. And 
we’re over South African airspace. 
 
SO: Whether that was a South African beacon or whatever. Pik Botha argues 
that it was nothing to do with South Africa. Well, maybe it was nothing 
to do with the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, but it could 
have been a decision within the South African military. With the idea of 
the security mission: was this Sonny’s initiative, or was this in response 
to a request from the… 
 
HC: That’s a good question… 
 
SO: Because this is kind of ‘out of area’, in terms of Commonwealth 
activity… 
 
HC: It was very different and very unusual. It was, indeed. It was a bit like the 
Commonwealth initiative we took in Uganda – to prop up the military and the 
police. The CMTTU, it was called. Military training. It was very out of 
character. 
 
SO: Yes, because the Brits had done it with BMATT in Zimbabwe. But that 
had been a British bilateral initiative… 
 
HC: Yes, that’s right. 
 
SO: But, this was a Commonwealth initiative in Uganda. 
 
HC: Yes, it was. It followed upon the Zimbabwe success. It emerged from 
discussions with Obote. Ramphal, Malhoutra and I flew into Kampala from 
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Arusha for a day, during the Tanzanian military occupation. The security 
mission to the FLS was a follow-up to Nassau, but it was one of those things 
we put on ice until after the Eminent Persons Group was done. The report 
was written and I think it was a good report, and it led to some sort of 
assistance. But it was a massive problem. The Commonwealth could hardly 
scratch the surface of what was needed. But we were ushered into the 
presidential palaces of all these states and had very good discussions with 
them. Obasanjo, again, proved himself to have marvellous rapport with all of 
the Africans. 
 
SO: Were you liaising with the British Foreign Office at all about this? 
 
HC: Very little but we did generally liaise with the Foreign Office and the 
Commonwealth desk in particular, but I don’t remember anything significant 
about on this exercise. The Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa 
was the main source of exchange on all these issues. 
 
SO: As you say, it’s unusual that you were doing a Security Mission. 
 
HC: Yes, that’s right. 
 
SO: Rather than economic development, state capacity building, [or the] 
training of diplomats. This was a hard power issue, and the 
Commonwealth tends to stay in the soft power area. Just another 
question associated with the Eminent Persons Group to South Africa: 
you were a senior member of the Secretariat support team in Southern 
Africa. What did you do in Europe and North America? 
 
HC: Well, the EPG travelled. Fraser and Obasanjo travelled after the EPG to 
Europe and to North America and into Southern Africa. Stuart would’ve been 
involved in some of this as well; Jeremy Pope was involved to a lesser extent.  
But, we went off to Bonn and to Paris, and we met all sorts of influential 
people. And then to Washington… 
 
SO: So, this was a briefing tour? 
 
HC: Yes, it was. It was to brief them on the findings of the Eminent Persons Group 
in a first hand way and to get to the decision-makers. So, we were talking to 
foreign ministers in Europe, and my involvement in the North American trip 
was more marginal than it was in Europe, where we met people like Willy 
Brandt and Helmut Schmidt in Germany, and similarly in France. 
 
SO: So, was this part of a drive for international recognition…? 
 
HC: International recognition and support. 
 
SO: But also a drive for economic and financial sanctions. 
 
HC: This is where Fraser is very important in his account of what happened in 
Washington. I wasn’t there for that part of it, but later, in New York. But 
Washington was very important because the EPG got to the key 
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Congressional leaders and managed to have the Reagan administration’s 
position on sanctions significantly changed. Not immediately, but it certainly 
flowed as a result of that visit. Did Fraser talk to you about that? 
 
SO: Yes, he did. 
 
HC: And then, of course, in Southern Africa we went to Lusaka to see the ANC, 
and to Zimbabwe, Tanzania and beyond. 
 





SO: Why not? 
 
HC: Well, let me give you another often over-looked dimension of the initiative that 
Sonny Ramphal took. I remember Emeka dealt with it in his book. Post-
Nassau, a few things happened. At the Nassau meeting, Heads had 
appointed seven countries to oversee the EPG exercise. As the final session 
was breaking, Sonny grabbed me and said, “I want to see Rajiv, Hawke, 
Mulroney, Kenneth, Robert and Pindling. You’ve got to get them now before 
they get in their planes and go.” So, we walked out of the Executive Session 
room and I had to muster these people, and we stood – I can remember this 
as clear as it was yesterday – in the executive lounge and there was Bob 
Hawke, Rajiv Gandhi, Brian Mulroney, Lindon Pindling, Robert Mugabe, [and] 
Kenneth Kaunda. And he said to them, “We’ve now got the green light to go 
ahead with this without delay. How are we going to do it, and who are the 
Eminent Persons to be?”   
 
 Now, Nigeria was under Babangida at the time, so they weren’t there. 
Thatcher wasn’t there – two key countries central to operation. They talked 
about it, and I remember Sonny turned to Hawke and said, “Who could you 
provide?”  And Hawke said to him, “I think I could deliver either Gough 
Whitlam or Malcolm Fraser, depending on persuading my cabinet and who’s 
available.”  And he turned to Mugabe, standing there just in a random circle… 
I don’t think even Moni or Emeka was there, it was just Sonny and I. Sonny 
turned to Mugabe and Kaunda and said, “What do you think? Who would you 
prefer?” and they both said, “Malcolm Fraser.” And Hawke said, “That’s going 
to be a little more difficult. I’m not sure if I could deliver him, given it would not 
be popular with my colleagues. But I’ll take it to cabinet and I’ll argue it.” And 
he delivered Fraser. That’s the origin of that. 
 
 Immediately, [when] we got back to London, Sonny was very keen to get the 
EPG together. Emeka claims credit for delivering Obasanjo. I’m not going to 
query that. Relations with the Nigerian government were very delicate at that 
stage and Obasanjo was still held in great regard by his military juniors, who 
were now running the country. I had personal experience of that when I went 
with him to meet Babangida in Lagos. So, the group assembled in London but 
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not without considerable in-house difficulty. Emeka tells a story about the 
Africans threatening to withdraw. Thatcher tried to get Geoffrey Howe to lead 
the mission. The South African mission in London were predictably cool about 
the whole idea. There were lots of obstacles to the project even getting off the 
ground. 
 
 The Africans were very wary, and Emeka tells a story of going off to Africa to 
deliver the EPG. I frankly don’t recall that; I wasn’t with him. Stuart Mole 
perhaps was with him. I doubt it - it would be unusual for him to do that by 
himself. The South African government, Winnie Mandela, Allan Boesak, the 
ANC, the UDF, the PAC, everyone – all of the key players came out against 
it, basically saying, “This is something we ourselves have got to solve.” There 
had been European attempts at bridging the gap, and the word out of South 
Africa was very negative, right across the board. The crucial thing in the end 
was that we were able to negotiate with a South African government that 
didn’t want the EPG. In the full likelihood that the SAG would not issue visas 
to the EPG, Sonny was able to negotiate that Moni Malhoutra and I would be 
accepted as special Commonwealth emissaries to visit South Africa in 
advance of the EPG, to explain to all the parties on the ground the mandate 
and approach of the EPG. We went for a couple of weeks, with the view to 
meeting as many key players as possible and explaining to them the 
proposed nature of the mission. Special visas were issued: as an Australian, I 
couldn’t get into South Africa, especially diplomats. 
 
 Anyway, I had to get a new passport and all of that to go, but eventually we 
went to South Africa as the EPG special envoys. We moved between Cape 
Town, Pretoria and Johannesburg and saw all of those key players. The visit 
didn’t receive much attention in the end because of all the drama associated 
with the EPG. But it is written up, and I actually quote it in my thesis. Many 
people claim credit for all sorts of things relating to the EPG, but there is no 
doubt in my mind that this visit broke the barrier. Subsequent to this, the 
South African government agreed that a limited number of the EPG should 
visit the country and – as a result – Fraser, Obasanjo and Dame Nita Barrow 
went, supported by Moni, Emeka, myself and a few Secretariat staff.  
 
SO: That’s right, because they went on a preliminary tour. 
 
HC: Yes, it then occurred in stages. But, importantly, in getting to see key people 
and to explain what the Commonwealth’s position meant, the total group were 
eventually able to visit. But the important thing about [this] was – in my view – 
that we got to see some very key, important people; just Moni and I. Perhaps 
most important of all was Winnie Mandela. I remember it was through Ismael 
Ayoub, who was Nelson Mandela’s lawyer – since discredited, like Winnie, I 
guess. We were secreted into the suburbs of Johannesburg somewhere. I’ve 
got no idea where, because we seemed to be driving for hours and ended up 
in a Boer-type motel and Winnie, under house arrest at this stage, suddenly 
appeared. We sat and had quite contentious but a good conversation with 
her; that’s just Moni, me, Ismael Ayub and Winnie. The next day we were 
travelling from Jo’burg to Cape Town and at the airport there was a cluster of 
press surrounding Winnie, who was going down to pay her monthly visit to 
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Nelson. As we walked past she caught sight of me – out of the corner of her 
eye – and said, “Wait there, I want to talk to you.” We waited behind and 
walked onto the aircraft together. I was sitting in my seat and had a tap on the 
shoulder from a steward who said, “Mrs. Mandela would like you to come and 
sit next to her on the flight.” 
 
SO: It’s a two hour flight. 
 
HC: That’s right. So, of course I agreed, and she had asked the guy sitting next to 
her to move to my seat, so I went down and sat next to her. When Moni found 
about this and saw me sitting next to Winnie he insisted on having half the 
flight. Well, I don’t really blame him for it. We built up this beautiful 
relationship with Winnie and that was very important. Her support for the EPG 
was really important. The other important thing that happened on that visit – 
again, just Moni and I – was that the Canadians facilitated our access to 
another very important dissident who was under house arrest and couldn’t 
leave his house in Cape Town. We were taken to the Canadian Mission in 
Cape Town, sat in a back room and, again, seemingly waiting for hours. Who 
was to walk in through the back door and up the back steps but Trevor 
Manuel, later a major figure in the ANC government. We had a good talk to 
Trevor about the purpose of the EPG mission and its objectives. That built up 
a relationship with Trevor that Emeka speaks very highly of in his book – you 
might remember – in establishing productive EPG links into the UDF and the 
ANC. 
 
 And the third person who was absolutely crucial in all of this – and drawn in 
on that first visit by Moni and me – was Rev. Allan Boesak, who was a 
brilliant, colourful and high profile anti-apartheid exponent, very influential in 
UDF/ANC leadership circles. We also met a wide circle of others: South 
African officials, the Executives of the UDF, PAC and COSATU, and many of 
the key bodies and individuals. As a result of that visit, the EPG mission was 
able to go forward. I was very closely involved in all of that preliminary 
preparatory work and then in every aspect of the EPG’s work. 
 
SO: Let’s see… the Nassau CHOGM was October, and the EPG mission itself 
began in February… 
 
HC: Yes, so this was in January some time. I remember everyone went on home 
leave except me. I had to stay in London to continue the contacts with the 
SAG and, hopefully, to await a positive response – which eventually came. 
That would’ve been in January some time. 
 
 But, one other story, and [then] I’ll stop the anecdotes…but they’re important 
in terms of showing you how the Secretariat operated. Moni and I came back 
and wrote up a very short report on that visit and that was injected into the 
next meeting of the EPG. It was from that stage forward that we got official 
messages from the South African Embassy, giving a green light for an EPG 
visit – in minuted form – to go to South Africa. Had I come to the Witness 
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Seminar in London – I had my speech prepared, by the way – my remarks 
would have been under the title, “I never met Nelson Mandela”. You might 
ask why is that significant, you know, when millions of others haven’t either. 
I’d say, well, it is important, because in every stage of those nine years that I 
was involved in London, I believe that I played an instrumental role, a back-
stage role, because that’s what officials do and diplomats do, at every 
important point in the process that eventually led to the release of Mandela 
and the breakdown of the apartheid system in South Africa. I’ve got 
photographs on my wall from Winnie with expressions of her personal thanks 
written on them. There was an occasion when we went out to her house in 
Soweto – Moni, me, and Dominic Sankey...   
 
 We went out at a later time to deliver the Third World Prize of a million dollars 
to Nelson Mandela [and] to Winnie, in the garden of her home in Soweto – 
where, presumably, all these necklacing were alleged to have taken place. 
And we’ve got a photograph of that occasion – with her daughter, with Winnie 
– saying, “To Hugh, with love and thanks for all that you’ve done”, and then 
Christmas cards written to my children saying, “Your father’s done wonderful 
things to help South Africa.” I never met Nelson Mandela: didn’t even lay eyes 
on him. Even all the staff met him when he came to Marlborough House. 
There, on their desks, are photographs of them with Nelson. It doesn’t really 
matter to me, but it was important that the EPG got to see him in prison. 
Obasanjo had been seeing Nelson. He saw him twice at least, before the 
EPG itself. Once, on that preliminary visit, I think they whisked him away, and 
then secondly, during another time when we were in Jo’burg, they whisked 
him away to see Mandela, and then later the full group got to see him.   
 
 When the word came through that the group were to see Mandela, the two 
key people in this whole process in the Secretariat – besides Emeka and 
Moni – were Jeremy Pope and me and we were left behind. You’ll probably 
gather from some of the writings that that was a very tense relationship – 
between Anyaoku and Malhoutra – that I got caught up in. Emeka mentions a 
particular confrontation that he had with Moni, which involved me – I think, 
unfairly, but that’s happened. When the word came through to the EPG at the 
Cape Sun Hotel at Newlands everyone came down. We used to travel in 
white Mercedes cars. Jeremy Pope and I were present as usual. What a pity 
you can’t interview Jeremy, because he was such an important person in all 
this. We came down to the foyer, all ready to go, and the Eminents and 







HC: But, why do I emphasise that? Because it reflects on the type of Secretariat 
we’re dealing with, right? Where rank is important and where important 





HC: And, I’m not critical of that, because they were the two senior people there. 
But they had a bit of a contest going between themselves. In every other 
case, Jeremy and I, as key persons, were there setting up the meetings, 
making the contacts, taking/editing the record, even in the one-on-one 
meetings. So, I never got to see the man – and it’s been one of those regrets! 
…You’ve probably met him, haven’t you? [Laughter] 
 
SO: No, I didn’t. 
 
HC: But, those garden parties at Marlborough House to which he came 
later…Everyone met him, had dinner with him. Even when he came here to 
Canberra, I was out of the country, but there you are. 
 
 





SO: Sue Onslow talking to Dr. Hugh Craft on Wednesday, 26th March, 2014, 
Part Two. Hugh, you had made a reference earlier to the comparative 
aspects of the Grenada crisis of 1983 – John Compton’s remarks that 
there could be an incident like that in his own island state. And then the 
events in Fiji, in 1987, when General Sitiveni Rabuka ousted the 
democratic government of Prime Minister Timoci Bavadra. Please could 
you reflect on the Fiji crisis of ‘87? 
 
HC: Well, what followed was the establishment of the Expert Group on Small 
States at the Delhi meeting, and their report to the Nassau meeting. The 
course that this took was very interesting. In putting the group together and 
also in shaping the report, I must give credit to Neville Linton, who worked in 
my division and who was a key writer of the report. The report – provoked by 
the situation in Grenada – dealt with hard politics involving American 
influence in the Western hemisphere. The project gave rise to outcomes that 
were really quite unrelated. Essentially, this was a case of an internal conflict 
that almost invited third party intervention by the US and the Eastern 
Caribbean States. But the report did not deal with the bigger geopolitical 
issues – like great power rivalries, US hegemony etc. The result of the 
consultations led to quite different outcomes on the vulnerability of small 
states, which have been all important in the latter day success of the rise of 
Small States as an important actor in international diplomacy. 
 
Let me explain. We had three or four consultative meetings in various regions 
– including in the Seychelles, the Bahamas and in Wellington – in putting that 
report together. What came out of it was the belief that Ramphal eventually 
refined in our internal consultations, on what emerged as the key vulnerability 
impacting on all Small States, particularly the Island States: the question of 
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their vulnerability to economic deprivation, or institutional deprivation, if you 
like. In other words, that the Commonwealth would do best not to focus on 
the military dimensions of security, but on the administrative and economic 
vulnerabilities of Small States. 
 
SO: So, this was ‘human security’? 
 
HC: It’s latterly described as ‘human security’, yes. And, I can remember the 
discussions in the final days of putting that report together focused on what 
the sharp point of the report should be, and the ultimate catch-cry around 
which you can rally your main recommendations, and we, in our division, 
came up with the title of the report: ‘Vulnerability: Small States in the Global 
Society’. And the ‘Vulnerability’ label has stuck. I think it’s been a good one, 
because it does describe – I think, very well – the predicament of Small 
States as being about vulnerability above all else. Now, the Compton 
prediction was absolutely right: not in respect of his own country, but in terms 
of the South Pacific. Having had a posting in Suva, I knew Steve Rabuka 
quite well, because he was the military liaison between RFMF, the Royal Fiji 
Military Forces, and the Australian government on matters relating to security. 
So, he used to be in and out of the Australian High Commission quite a lot, 
and had been a guest in my home on a number of occasions. So, I knew the 
man well and I couldn’t really believe that he’d come to this point. But the Fiji 
situation brought together a number of problems, as we look back on it. One 
was the deficiencies of the 1970 constitution, which really institutionalised 
racism in the Fiji-broad community. 
 
SO: Because of the land question? 
 
HC: The land question, the voting question, the way the parliament was 
constructed and so on. It was obviously meant to concede primus inter pares 
status on the indigenous Fijian population and their systems of governance – 
namely, the Great Council of Chiefs. When it was seen that [that] was brought 
to nothing by the victory of Bavadra and his support from the Indian 
community, then things began to unravel. Rabuka was caught up in that, 
believing himself to be the knight in shining armour, coming to rescue the 
situation of the indigenous Fijians. The subsequent story, I think, has been a 
sad one, but may yet prove to be important. 
 
SO: How did you learn of the coup?  Did it come over the wire? 
 
HC: Yeah, that’s right. I mean, via public broadcasts... 
 
SO: Was this a crisis for the Secretariat to confront on behalf of the 
Commonwealth? Or, because of the position of the Governor General, 
was this a constitutional crisis within Fiji, and its relationship to The 
Crown? 
 
HC: Oh, it certainly was that, no question about that. There were two elements. 
We were notified by the news broadcasts. I was able to make a phone call to 
my successor as the Deputy High Commissioner in Suva and talk to him 
about it. So, that’s the way it built up our information, and we were seeing it in 
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two bits, really.  Even in those days, when we were dealing with military 
governments and military take-overs, where Sonny had a fairly flexible view 
of military government, he certainly didn’t didn’t like it. But he always believed 
in the old view and UN principle of non-interference, and that “this country’s 
got to solve its internal problems itself”.  So he’d be urging – from the outset – 
the return to democratic rule and good governance as being a valued cardinal 
principle. So, that was the first point – and that really fell on deaf ears in a 
way, because the concerns of the Fijians were over and above that.They 
eventually involved the Governor General, whose relationship with the Queen 
was seen as a lifeline, really, in terms of restoring stability. But even that 
became complicated by the fact that, in the end, he and Ratu Mara went over 
to the dark side, if you like. 
 
SO: The Governor General was Ratu Penaia, wasn’t it? 
 
HC: Ratu Penaia Ganilau, yes. It all came on the eve of the Vancouver meeting as 
well, and so the Australians and New Zealanders were very exercised by it. 
You can talk to Gareth Evans about this. He, at one stage, was contemplating 
an activist Australian intervention. Exactly what form that might take or 
whether Gareth really wanted Australian intervention is another matter, but it 
was being touted as a possible Australian and New Zealand response. That’s 
the way they saw it; that’s the seriousness with which they viewed what was 
happening. People like Mulroney who already were seeing – by the time of 
the Vancouver CHOGM – the influx of Fiji Indians into Canada… Many of the 
Fijian intelligentsia had settled in Canada…  He saw it as a worrying trend, 
not only for Canada but also for the future of Fiji. 
 
I don’t think Sonny had a great deal of influence on the Palace on Fiji. You 
would need to talk to him about that. While he had very close relationships 
with HM and the Palace, the Queen felt very keenly about Fiji. As you will 
know, having served there with the British, there is a soft spot in the heart of 
the royal family for Fiji, for all sorts of reasons. And I think there was a huge 
amount of disappointment and disillusionment about Fiji that was enveloping 
the situation about then. But in terms of the Commonwealth’s role, I don’t 
think Sonny overplayed his hand in the Palace. He would have spoken to and 
listened to William Heseltine. Bob Hawke, on the other hand, who’d been at 
university with Heseltine in Western Australia, was on the phone to him 
urging the Queen to take a particular line, and you might like to talk to Mr. 
Hawke about that. I think the Secretariat did what it could. But it was caught 
in a pincer movement between very strong, bellicose, threatening, regional 
members (Australia and New Zealand), an Indian government overly 
protective [of] the Fiji Indian populace, and an overly sentimental palace. The 
Fiji situation could not have been played out the same way a decade later. 
 
SO: One of the people I spoke to has commented that they felt that Sonny 
Ramphal was influenced as being part of a wider Indian world, and that 
nationalist Indians had been thwarted in various aspects in Caribbean 
politics. This person’s argument was that Sonny was influenced by this 
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formative background and believed that they shouldn’t be so thwarted 
again. Now, I don’t know if there is any truth in this perception… 
 
HC: I didn’t ever see any of that in Sonny’s approach, and certainly not on Fiji.  
 
SO: Thank you. 
 
HC: But Sonny was very conscious of his roots, very conscious of the implications 
of indentured labour in the Caribbean and the Pacific. I always thought that 
the Indian problem was a wider one for the Pacific than just [for] Fiji. Can I 
just go to an aside? I don’t think the Commonwealth ever did very well in the 
Pacific. One of the reasons for that is that they always seem to be too distant: 
they’re a long way away. Fraser recognised this when he wanted to establish 
a regional Secretariat office in Australia. But also, in my view, the Secretariat 
had been sending the wrong people there – mainly officers and experts of 
Indian origin – and not getting the right response. I don’t want to seem racist 
in this sense, but, in my assessment, the Pacific islands themselves looked 
aghast at Fiji’s ethnic problems, and were very conscious of this in the 
Secretariat’s approach. 
 
SO: They’re very sensitive? 
 
HC: Yes, to the problems that indigenous Indians had caused for Fiji. Also, 
because the ruling political classes in Fiji are basically Polynesian rather than 
Melanesian. The whole Lau group, as you know, have particular loyalties: 
they have royal status in Tonga. And Ratu Mara (who was from Lau) became 
an outstanding leader – internationally, but also in the Commonwealth. The 
region in those years identified very closely with him and his cohorts. During 
the 1987 crisis I think Sonny’s principal concern was to see him still involved 
and not disadvantaged by all the things that were happening. But, at the 
same time, [he was] insisting that the elections were throwing up a particular 
result and that this had to be recognised as representing legitimate Indian 
political interests. 
 
SO: Do you remember Timoci Bavadra coming to London and trying to see 
Sonny? 
 
HC: Yes, I do.  
 
SO: Did you meet him? 
 
HC: No, I didn’t. No. Did he ever see Sonny? I’m not sure if he did. 
 
SO: No. Michael Fathers wrote a particularly critical piece, saying that Sonny 
should have seen this elected leader, who’d effectively been ousted. 
 
HC: Yeah, and I think that Satendra – the other day, at our meeting – was very 
critical of this. 
 
SO: Yes, he felt that passionately. 
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HC: Very passionately, yes. Again, I think Sonny seems to have been caught in 
the pincer movement here. And I don’t think his ‘Indian-ness’ had any 
influence on the way he thought, but who knows? He’s very passionate about 
all of this stuff. 
 
SO: Were you aware of any particular sensitivities, particular interest and 
input, from India? 
 
HC: Oh yes, very much so. Even going back to my posting in Suva. The Indian 
High Commissioner was very exercised by the political claims being made by 
the Indian community [in Fiji] on running the country, basically. And, you 
know, even in our day [late 1970s], they had those outstanding Indian leaders 
like SM Koya, Jai Ram Reddy and, Mrs Irene Jai Narayan. These were very 
powerful people that Ratu Mara successfully integrated into his Alliance Party 
government. It became the political way of doing things in Fiji – either in 
opposition or in government – but the thought that the traditional Fijian and 
indigenous leadership would no longer be in control of running the country 
was a bridge too far, obviously, for the military, and basically for the 
indigenous community. 
 
SO: You and I both know that by the late 1970s the community percentage 
was 44% indigenous Fijian… 
 
HC: 52% Indians. With the balance were mixed race and so on. That’s right.  
They’ve reversed it now, you know that? 
 
SO: Yes I do. So, as far as the outcome of the Fiji coups in 1987 were 
concerned, you were obviously using the Australian High Commission 
down in Suva as a particular source of information. When Fiji was 
suspended at the Vancouver meeting, did you try to maintain any sorts 
of information links under the radar? Or was it the question of Fiji being 
suspended from the councils of the Commonwealth and all links being 
cut? 
 
HC: Let me tell you about the initiative that Sonny took. A special South Pacific 
Forum meeting was called in Apia. Sonny despatched me as head of the 
Political Division, Jeremy Pope as head of the Legal Division, and a New 
Zealander. 
 
SO: Straight after the Vancouver CHOGM? 
 
HC: Yes, that’s right. Together with Neroni Slade – who is now head of the Pacific 
Islands Forum – and a Samoan, [we went] to Apia to sit on the sidelines of 
the meeting and to advise him on what might be the appropriate 
Commonwealth response, and also to facilitate any outcomes. Now, 
important in all this was Bob Hawke – and I’ll relate one series of events that 
involve the Commonwealth very closely.  
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Bob Hawke was very keen to find an EPG solution to the Fiji problem, 
wanting to promote a Pacific EPG. Hawke was pressing for this and lobbying, 
but not with a great deal of support. But I remember his Senior Private 
Secretary – we were all staying at Aggie Grey’s [Hotel] – saying that Bob 
Hawke wanted to see me about this. We set up a meeting, we talked about it, 
and as a result of that meeting he wanted me to facilitate contact with Sonny. 
So, in the middle of the morning – about five o’clock in the morning from 
memory, it was some ungodly hour – I was ushered into his suite where he 
and Hazel were still getting out of bed, still in their pyjamas, and set up this 
call to talk to Sonny. Clearly, it was in the pre-mobile phone days…  
 




HC: They had to pick the time carefully. Anyway, we sat around with Hawke in his 
pyjamas and he had this conversation with Ramphal and was to take it back 
to the executive meeting. It was only me in the room – not Jeremy or Neroni. 
They were, however, very important in this context with NZ’s David Lange 
and the Samoan Prime Minister. Nothing came of a wider Commonwealth 
role, as Hawke had hoped, but there was a South Pacific initiative set up that 
did involve two or three of the Heads of Government, under Hawke, to work 
for a South Pacific solution. But that in the end didn’t go anywhere much. You 
see, the problem was that there was a lot of sympathy in the Pacific region 
with Ratu Mara, less with Bavadra. Mara was always seen as a bit of a 
luminary and hero in the South Pacific. As you know, in our day, there was an 
indigenous political movement in Fiji involving ‘radical’ Fijians – always sitting 
on the edge of things, really. Bavadra was very respectable, there was no 
question about that, but a lot of the people supporting him were not held in 
very high regard by Pacific leaders. They were virtually on Ratu Mara’s side, 
and this happened in Vancouver as well. It was Australia and New Zealand, 
again, taking the running. 
 




SO: I know that they were peripheral players, and given his extraordinary 
authority and prestige in the Pacific, I wondered whether he had in fact 
come. 
 
HC: We had people working on his behalf there. Most of the Pacific Island’s elders 
recognised his stature and deplored the way that things had moved and 
basically blamed the Indian community, really, for all that had happened. 
 
SO: Was David Lange regarded as something of a wild card within the 
Commonwealth? 
 
HC: Yes, he was.   
 
34 
SO: I know that this particular time – between ‘83 and ’87 – was when 
Australia and New Zealand were very much at loggerheads because of 
the whole question of New Zealand’s drive to de-nuclearise the Pacific, 
and everything that meant for the ANZUS security umbrella. So, Lange 
was not seen as a collaborative soul? 
 
HC: No, David Lange was very interesting. I found him a very interesting character 
in the Commonwealth context. He was in Vancouver. My people who were 
transcribing the record – sitting up in the bleachers and taking it all down, and 
trying to make sense of it – had two complaints. This came officially to me 
from the people who were taking the record: they were parliamentary scribes. 
There were two prime ministers they couldn’t understand. One was David 
Lange, and the other was Bob Hawke. Bob Hawke, because of his very 
marked Australian ‘strine’ accent, and David Lange, because he spoke in 








HC: But, you know, the interesting thing about David Lange was that he lost 
interest in things. He pursued some of these Labour party policies 
internationally with great passion and then, basically, lost interest. I remember 
going with Sonny to see him in Wellington in the Beehive – the parliamentary 
building there – and we went up to his suite on the top floor, and he almost 
said to Sonny that he was bored. He looked bored, and he acted bored, and it 
wasn’t long after that that he pulled the plug, I think. But, any attempts by 
Sonny to engage him…  
 
SO: Were resisted? 
 
HC: Now, Chris Laidlaw – you should speak to Chris about this when you see him. 
 
SO: I know. I will. 
 
HC: He knew Lange very well. As did Jeremy Pope, I might say. 
 
SO: Please, Hugh, could I ask you about your view of the value of 
Commonwealth Senior Officials meetings? You attended Arusha in 
Tanzania in ’82, Dhaka, Bangladesh in ’84, Bridgetown, Barbados in ’86...  
How far did they help to give continuing substance to the 
Commonwealth as an entity and as an international organisation? Or 
were they really a distraction? 
 
HC: Well, I’ve got a particular axe to grind on this, and I’m not sure if anybody else 
has. The change took place as a result of the Coolum meeting. The last 
Senior Officials meeting was in Apia, and that would’ve been in early 2001. 
CHOGM was set down for October, November. I went to that because, by this 
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stage, I was head of the CHOGM task force here in Canberra, in the Prime 
Minister’s department, setting up the Brisbane meeting, followed by what 
became the Coolum meeting. The concept that had been established – well-
established by the time that I arrived in the Secretariat – was that, in the off 
year, CHOGM Senior Officials would meet, at the very highest levels. Pitched 
at Cabinet Secretaries, or Heads of Prime Ministers’ Department. 
 
SO: But not Foreign Ministers? 
 
HC: Not Foreign Ministers, because Foreign Ministers really didn’t have any part 
to play at CHOGM. This is was what was devised by Trudeau at the meeting 
in Ottawa. So, you had these very senior people coming to Senior Officials 
meetings – and coming relatively enthusiastically, because they knew that 
CHOGM was something involving their Head of Government, personally. So 
we would have senior people turning up at these meetings and playing a 
constructive part. In my experience – I went to three or four – they were like a 
management committee of the Secretariat, because they looked at things like 
budget and they had reports on all current political and administrative 
[activities] – like a stocktake on the functioning of the Secretariat. They looked 
at the outcomes of the previous Heads of Government meeting, and they 
looked forward to the next meeting in terms of setting the agenda and the 
priorities. It was a very productive arrangement. Meetings that did a 
multiplicity of things, that helped with the administration; the smooth running, 
the political focus, targets and the indicators of what was successful or not so 
successful in the Commonwealth association.   
 
Additionally, they took the Commonwealth to places that it would not 
otherwise have gone. In Apia, for example, this collection of senior people 
from around the world would arrive – bringing with them the associated 
benefits of the Commonwealth presence, as well [as] levels of exposure 
which, for many of these member states, were relatively quite huge. These 
SOMs were almost always held in places where you were unlikely to be 
having a CHOGM, but focused local and regional attention on what the 
Commonwealth was doing. During the preparations for the Coolum meeting, 
or the Brisbane meeting, originally, one of the things that captivated the 
people on the political side – especially in the Australian Foreign Affairs – was 
the need to bring the Secretariat into line in terms of modern accounting, 
performance and transparency-type things. Additionally, they always felt the 
SOMs were a bit of an indulgence – and they might have been. The 
Secretariat has a tendency to take too many people, many of whom appeared 
to sit around doing not much, and it was no doubt inconvenient for people in 
Canberra to be heading off to, say, Arusha and places like that – stuck out in 
the middle of nowhere. So, the Australian government drove this agenda and 
successfully lobbied to have it all changed in the name of management 
efficiencies. Based on cash savings, really. And they’ve substituted in place 
of the SOM – and I don’t know a lot about it because it’s post my time – 
management meetings in London. Now, I believe that the diminution of the 
CHOGM which we’re now witnessing is the outcome, in part, of that process 
set in place after Coolum – where you have expectations lowered, fewer 
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Heads of Government turning up, the lack of focus in the agenda where you 
get CHOGM producing 11,000 words of communiqués… Even in my day we 
tried to cut it back. And in terms of enlivening the Commonwealth in its most 
important parts, in its regions, [that] has been lost. What has been substituted 
is a management system based on committees, serviced by inconsequentials 
on the whole, because these meetings in London – I’d need to check on the 
attendance record, but my guess is that I am probably right – most of the 
people who turn up from the High Commissions in London are second or third 
secretaries, operating in most cases without any real brief from their capital. 
So, the whole operation has fallen victim to modern management methods, 
favoured by the ABC countries. 
 
 They run this very tightly managed agenda of basically controlling the 
Secretariat under a neo-liberal approach to management, with all the 
politically correct outcomes in modern ‘management-speak’. As I said the 
other day at the seminar, sounding the death knell of the Commonwealth as a 
particular sort of political association. I don’t think anyone’s suggesting the 
Secretariat shouldn’t be brought up to the standards of modern management 
practice. But it should be given the flexibility of movement that a soft power 
organisation needs to move in the areas and amongst the people and in the 
issues that they need to. I imagine my successors and others have spent 
most of their time producing endless papers about performance indicators 
and the like. 
 
SO: Showing that they’re meeting targets and delivering efficiencies? 
 
HC: Yes, that’s right. And that requires a special sort of leadership – to manage 
that in a productive way – and whether the current Secretary General has it or 
not is questionable. I give him full credit for being a fine and decent man, but 
it does take a particular sort of leadership to be able to cut through and to call 
the bluff of officialdom in influential member countries. The problem is that 
this system itself was being developed in the Secretariat over a period of 
years – particularly in the 90’s and the early 2000’s. For example…and I think 
Don McKinnon probably set it in motion when, in the Political Affairs Division, 
for example, they created various formal sections – like a Good Governance 
section and a Democracy section, etc. – whereas in my day it was done 
differently. And I’m not saying this is better but it was a different way of 
working, with the responsibility for subject areas spread across the division 
and between the officers who worked in their areas of strength, but it wasn’t 
formalised. Establishing silos not only stifles the prospect of effective political 
outcome but equally results in poor management on the ground.  
 
I found, for example, in the Maldives in late 2013, this was a real problem. 
You had a very distinguished group of eminent Commonwealth citizens in the 
COG – led by Lawrence Gonzi, who is outstanding in my view. There was a 
sense in which our work was being deliberately controlled by ComSec officers   
following a particular mantra on democracy. I’m not convinced this was a 
healthy way of operating. But never mind, that’s another matter. But more 
seriously, the observer group – apart from the Chair, I’d say – was being kept 
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deliberately ignorant of what was happening at the same time on the good 
governance side, which was really the ‘good offices’ of Don McKinnon as the 
SG’s special representative to the Maldives – as if the two areas of the 
Commonwealth’s concern were separate and unconnected. 
 
SO: So, there was a complete divergence? 
 
HC: In my perception, yes. And it was only on my insistence and the insistence of 
one or two others that we were actually briefed on McKinnon’s role, which 
intertwined with our role at several crucial junctures. How you could issue an 
interim report by the Commonwealth observer group without acknowledging 
the fact that there was another stream happening at the same time, under 
Don McKinnon? It defies belief. But, this was the line the Secretariat officers 
were pushing – successfully, initially – with Gonzi. With one or two others we 
were quite intolerant of this, saying that this can’t be, saying we’ve got to be 
briefed. Don McKinnon eventually arrived in Malé on his mission and we had 
a good close working relationship with him, and he thoroughly briefed the 
group. But, initially, they were happening on two different levels. 
 




SO: He was working in the Legal Division of the Secretariat and I understand 
that he was involved in the ‘good offices’ role and supposed to be the 
Rapporteur of the observer mission. 
 
HC: I haven’t seen him in the Maldives. He might have been there, of course. We 
didn’t see him. 
 
SO: Who was spinning the policy line? 
 
HC: I expect it was to do with well established practice. The Secretariat has 
conducted so many COG exercises that I think they have established the best 
way of completing each exercise most effectively. This was the ‘democracy’ 
area at work. I, having been involved in a few observer group exercises and 
having seen them run by quite senior people, like Matthew Neuhaus and 
Amitav Banerji… In one case Stuart Mole and and I were involved in Nigeria. 
I just felt it was totally bizarre and very strange, but, in the end, I think we got 
our way, and we were briefed by McKinnon who was very good. Mind you, I 
think the whole Maldives project has been overcooked. I don’t know how the 
Secretariat can afford the resources.   
 
 But, in the end, I think the report was a good one. It was a very difficult, pear-
shaped exercise. There was a lot of political and legal interference in the 
process. The electoral commission and the electoral commissioner, in our 
view, were impeccable in the way they did their work. He’s since been 
dismissed, as you probably know.  
 
SO: Fuwad Thowfeek? Yes.  
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HC: He’s on a suspended jail sentence. I don’t quite know what for, but it confirms 
our deepest fears. I’ve been in touch with Lawrence Gonzi about it: probably 
a bit of pay-back. With the amount of resources the Commonwealth has put 
into the Maldives over the years – particularly with Don McKinnon’s exercise – 
member governments are asking with so little practical outcomes whether it is 
all worth it. Certainly, my own government is asking that question. 
 
SO: Well, the Maldives was seen originally as a Commonwealth good news 
story. 
 
HC: It was. But it’s all tipped on its head now. As if nothing has changed, you      
            know.  
 
SO:  If I could ask you, as we move towards the end of our discussion, Hugh, 
about the Commonwealth and the United Nations Organisation. You 
were a delegate to the United Nations General Assembly between ’79 
and ’88. Mark Robinson, of course, was instrumental in securing… 
 
HC: Yes. Observer status. 
 
SO: Observer status for the Commonwealth. I understand this group 




HC: Sitting there on the sidelines. 
 
SO: So, you went every September to the General Assembly annual meeting 
in New York? 
 
HC: Yes, and we sent officers that covered virtually the whole of the Assembly. 
Various members of the International Affairs Division would go and spend 
their time there. So, every year that I was in the Secretariat, I would have 
been in New York for at least two or three weeks during the Assembly, and 
additional time when we were negotiating the small states office in New York; 
I would’ve spent longer. We would also be there on special occasions: like on 
the Law of the Sea Convention, where the Commonwealth had a special 
interest, as shown in the report of the Expert Group report on the Law of the 
Sea and its implications for the Commonwealth, facilitated by my division. 
 
SO: I’ve got ‘Delegate to the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, New 
York, 1980, 1981’ in my bibliographic notes for your career. There is 
another reference to you writing a particular report on Ocean 
Management in 1984 – is that the one you were thinking of? 
 
HC: That’s the report, yes. 
 
SO: So, had the Law of the Sea originally been a Commonwealth initiative? 
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HC: Well, it’s interesting. Not a Commonwealth initiative as such. But it had very 
strong Commonwealth origins. As I mentioned earlier, Shirley Amarasinghe, 
the Sri Lankan Ambassador to the UN, was very instrumental in the early 
days of the initiative, as was Fiji’s Ambassador, Satya Nandan, who was very 
instrumental throughout the negotiations. He subsequently headed up the UN 
Seabed Authority based in Kingston, Jamaica. And, of course, Tommy Ko – 
the Singapore Ambassador of the UN – was the Chair of the Law of the Sea 
conferences. An absolutely brilliant negotiator and multilateral diplomat. They 
were all key Commonwealth operators. And there were probably others 
involved as they performed not a formal but a recognised Commonwealth 
role. We even picked up the implications of this in Fiji when I was on posting 
there. In the South Pacific Forum there were ongoing consultations on issues 
that had LOS dimensions, like on the Forum Fisheries Agency and Forum 
Shipping Line, both of which involved the exploitation and distribution of 
scarce resources in the South Pacific. The discussions that included a 
majority of Commonwealth members were always guided by what was 
happening in the Law of the Sea context. I think the Law of the Sea 
Convention was concluded finally in about 1982, and Ramphal set up an 
Expert Group based initially on the outcome of a CHOGRM meeting, to look 
at the implications of the Law of the Sea convention and the establishment of 
economic zones – exclusive economic zones – and what the impact might be 
on Commonwealth countries. 
 
SO: So, the negotiations for this were conducted primarily in New York, even 
though they may have been key Commonwealth actors? 
 
HC: Oh yes. We weren’t over there doing [anything] other than monitoring the 
progress and talking to the key people involved, and then of course we went 
into this in our own way. Again, it was a consultative group – an Expert Group 
– and we had meetings in various places around the Commonwealth, drawing 
together that report. 
 
SO: One question from something on your CV: you had been Secretary 
General of the Government Industry Conference against Chemical 
Weapons, Canberra in 1989…  
 
HC: Just after I came back from the Secretariat. 
 
SO: Was that more of an Australian national policy, rather than a 
Commonwealth dimension? 
 
HC: Gareth Evans was very seized by the fact that the Chemical Weapons 
Convention in the UN context had been bogged down for about 25 years in 
Geneva and he was determined to do something about it. He saw the way of 
nudging forward was to get industry locked into consultations with 
governments. After my return from London, I had been put in the Americas 
Branch preparing a policy paper [on] Latin America. The new Foreign Minister 
Gareth Evans expressed interest. The only advantage that came out of my 
two months there was [that] I visited all of our posts in Latin America, 
including Cuba, which was great. And then they took me out of it straight 
away and put me onto running the chemical weapons initiative. The reason 
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had nothing to do with my Commonwealth background, but I guess they knew 
that I had a lot of expertise in running international conferences. It turned out 
to be a very successful conference and Gareth got his way. And in the end 
the whole of the convention was adopted in the UN. He brought to Canberra 
a huge range of people from around the world – UN ambassadors and Senior 
Officials, as well as senior figures in the industry – and straight from that I 
went into the APEC project, another new Australian initiative. Heading up the 
first ever APEC Ministerial meeting here in Canberra. 
 
SO: In ’89, yes. Hugh, how far do you feel that the Commonwealth’s success 
as a diplomatic actor in your time, at the Secretariat, was precisely 
because it was operating below the radar? I raised this on Monday at 
the Witness Seminar: this question of invisibility. It’s been noted that 
this has been one of the Commonwealth’s secret weapons for the 
Secretary General and his staff – that they haven’t necessarily been high 
profile diplomatic actors – and therefore they have acquired an access 
and played a discreet but contributory role. 
 
HC: That’s largely right. But it’s forced upon them, I think, by the nature of the 
organisation. The calibre of the staff is so important. The SG is both hindered 
and aided by his senior staff. Sonny was very ambitious for the 
Commonwealth, and ambitious for himself. He saw himself as potentially an 
important player on the global scene. 
 
SO: Well, he aspired to be UN Secretary General. 
 
HC: Yes, he did. Although Ramphal was ambitious for the Commonwealth rather 
than looking beyond, and the Commonwealth benefits from having a person 
of ambition at the helm. Similarly, Emeka Anyaoku was ambitious for the 
sorts of things he was committed to. In his day, it was being on board in the 
global movement for good governance and democracy, bringing the 
Commonwealth to account on these issues. The 1990s was an era in world 
affairs where political priorities in the Commonwealth would’ve changed in 
any event. I don’t believe the Commonwealth drove that issue, for the world 
was becoming intolerant of military dictatorships and authoritarianism and the 
Commonwealth very successfully adapted itself to that role. I think we have 
probably gone overboard on it a bit. But it was, again, essentially a role 
supportive of the international community. Others would claim the 
Commonwealth had more of an influence than is ascribed to it. I believe it has 
been a supportive role, a ‘helping-the-world-to-negotiate’ role, a Ramphal 
forte. But it has caused some imbalance in the Secretariat’s political work, 
making more of it than it is really worth in terms of returns, ‘brownie points’. It 
has left the present Secretary-General, I think, with a bit of dilemma, because 
he has come to a Commonwealth that has so many issues running with 
unrealistic expectations. I didn’t agree, for example, with the Commonwealth 
going into the environmental side of things. You know, the project they have 
going in Guyana. 
 
SO: Oh, the Irokama Project. 
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HC: Yes.  I could never make sense of that. I think it’s done good work, but these 
things are probably the job of the global organisation, the UN, and its 
specialised agencies, and we should be doing what we can to support them. 
 
SO: So, you feel that the Commonwealth started to ape the United Nations, 
with a fraction of its resources? 
 
HC: Yes, it has done a bit and, in so doing, it has neglected some of its areas of 
strengths, like the CFTC. I don’t agree with those who say we should be rid of 
the development role. In the early days it saw its major role as a third world 
facilitator – a facilitator of third world aid to third world countries. Samoa 
getting a water engineer from Kenya, cutting through the red tape and getting 
results in record time, was a good thing. People involved in the hard-nosed 
debate would say, “Well, who is Samoa, where is Samoa? What’s that really 
got to do with the total scheme of things?”  In the Commonwealth context, it 
was important, because Ratu Mara could ring up and say, “Sonny, do you 
think you could get me an expert to do this? Or, on the Lome Convention, can 
you help me?” So, it has opted for other priorities and ways of doing things. It 
has overstretched itself beyond its resources and areas of advantage. The 
consequent damage done to its areas of principal resourcefulness are now 
beginning to show. 
 
SO: Hugh, I asked John Sheppard [this] on Monday and I repeated the 
question in my interview with him yesterday: how far is it true that the 
Commonwealth doesn’t matter because it’s not a hard power 
organisation? It has limited resources, it doesn’t make any impact on 
big issues such as disarmament, such as security, such as counter-
terrorism. Therefore, does it have any continuing value as a soft power 
organisation, in your view? 
 
HC: Oh, absolutely. Yes, I do, and I argue this in my thesis that it is one of a 
myriad of actors that has some unique features and characteristics that can 
put it at the disposal of the international community in certain key areas. I do 
believe it’s got an ongoing role. I think soft power organisations are riding 
high at the moment: that is, soft powered, consensual, non-legally binding 
organisations that have dialogue at the summit, as their mainspring. You 
couldn’t say that the G20 actually decides anything binding, but leaders talk 
about things, reach certain agreements and commitments to act, and then 
feed these ‘soft’ decisions into the other places where they do matter. 
 
SO: Part of a global exchange of ideas? 
 
HC: Exactly. That’s right, and that’s the way globalism works. It doesn’t work by 
making the UN a world government. It works in our day and age by 
autonomous international and regional organisations contributing – both in 
terms of intellectual content and political muscle and influence, collectively 
and individually as countries – to what’s happening in the more global scope.  
For example, some of the major problems facing the international community 
would be totally beyond the scope of the Commonwealth acting alone. We 
42 
talk about Syria, Crimea, Syria, Sudan and so on. They’re totally outside of 
the Commonwealth’s principal sphere of influence. But it’s important to 
recognise that the Commonwealth as an institution and the Commonwealth 
Secretary-General have established pathways that can be used to influence 
the major actors and individual people who count. Sonny was good at this 
and, for example, was able to sit down with some of the movers and shakers 
in Europe and the Third World and talk about bigger things in the 
commissions in which he was involved: the Palme Commission, the Brandt 
Commission, the Brundtland Commission, and the Commission of the ‘Two 
Princes’ on humanitarian issues. He earned the Commonwealth a lot of 
respect as an institution worth dealing with. 
 
 My division, IAD, was involved in disarmament and humanitarian 
commissions that enabled the Commonwealth to flex its muscles in different, 
wider areas. The Economic Division under Vishnu Persuad supported 
Ramphal in the Brandt Commission work. That had an impact on the 
Commonwealth’s individual contribution to global discussions on specific 
issues like in the UN, World Bank, and in regional organisations – say, the 
Caribbean community and western hemisphere politics, or fisheries 
discussions in the Pacific. Through all these avenues the Commonwealth 
could actually help its members to achieve their own goals.  
.  
SO: So, this isn’t simply process; this is, in fact, day-to-day diplomacy? 
 
HC: Yes. But the problem is, I think, the Commonwealth has been burdened by 
process of late. 
 
SO: Yes. Well, you made reference to those very lengthy declarations. 
 
HC: I can hardly believe it. 
 
SO: Indeed, what outcomes and impact are those genuinely going to have? 
 
HC: And I mentioned the Charter as well. I’m very disappointed about the Charter. 
I mean, it says all the right things, of course, but as an operative document it 
is in danger of becoming simply nice words. 
 
SO: As soon as you start signing up to a Charter, then the Commonwealth 




SO: If I could ask you two last questions about leadership, because that 
seems to be – in large part – the essence of the Commonwealth. The 
leadership of the Secretary General, and your view of Australian former 
Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser’s attempt to be Secretary General in ’88-
89; and, lastly, the role and value of the Queen, as monarch and head of 





SO: What is your view, then, of the particular qualities and necessary 
characteristics for the leadership role of the Secretary General? 
 
HC: Well, it’s interesting you mentioned Ramphal and Fraser. Fraser’s competitor 
was Anyaoku. Now, I think Fraser would have made a good Secretary- 
General. He would have been difficult to work with because he can be 
abrasive; [he] is a very formidable character, with clear goals, impatient for 
positive results. You know he’s not easy to deal with, but he was a politician, 
and I’ve always believed that the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth 
should best be a politician that knows how to move amongst leaders – not 
amongst senior bureaucrats. Now, Sonny was able to do that. Sonny was a 
hybrid politician, really. He was never an elected politician, but he was cast as 
a politician. 
 




SO: …and Minister of Foreign Affairs in Guyana. 
 
HC: So, he knew the game and he knew how to play it, and that gave him an 
edge. He was very good at it. Sonny has his own way. I don’t want to deify 
Sonny, because he had his feet of clay, as we all know. But he was good in 
the role, no question about that. Emeka wasn’t a politician. He was Foreign 
Minister of Nigeria for five minutes, but that didn’t make him a politician, and 
he was essentially the archetypical international bureaucrat, which is not a 
bad thing. We all aspire to that, that’s a good occupation. 
 
SO: Emeka bristled when I suggested that he was an international civil 
servant, and he said, “I’m an International Servant”. 
 
HC: [Laughter] Okay. Don McKinnon…a politician, yes, but a Foreign Minister. 
Australia didn’t get on very well with Donald McKinnon because… 
 
SO: He’s a New Zealander? 
 
HC: One, he’s a New Zealander, but he also beat us in our own backyard: he beat 
Alexander Downer on Bougainville. The New Zealanders always do better 
than we do in the Pacific and Alexander, for all his good intent with 
Bougainville, and Australia, with all their good intent in the Pacific, didn’t do 
as well as McKinnon. 
 
SO: What was Alexander trying to push through on Bougainville? 
 
HC: Well, being a former Australian territory, we thought we were first off the rank 
there. But we didn’t ever come up with anything that was innovative or 
progressive or – in the end – a sustainable formula for a settlement. Don 
McKinnon, on the other hand, did, and he got PNG leaders down into the 
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heartland of New Zealand and knocked out an agreement in the initial phase. 
That led to a way forward and he deserves full credit for that. I haven’t read 
his book, by the way. 
 
SO: ‘In the Ring’? 
 
HC: I should really get to do that. 
 
SO: Unfortunately – and he reflected on this himself when I interviewed him 
– he wanted to make it more policy-relevant, but his editor said, “No, it 
should be in a much chattier style to appeal for a wider audience.” And I 
was thinking, it’s a pity, because, as you say, he was a politician and he 
wanted to talk about the political stuff and the policy content. 
 
HC: Yes. But he was very much a Foreign Minister as well. You know, he thought 
as a Foreign Minister, and that was good. Then, the current man, Sharma, is 
no doubt a good man. India was expected to step up to the mark and they did 
– but possibly with the wrong sort of person, because he’s got a huge job, this 
man. He’s been bequeathed a Secretariat in a Commonwealth that’s sort of 
on the slide, and it takes a special sort of leadership in these sorts of times. 
 
SO: The energies, also, that are required of a Secretary General are 
enormous – to have quite so much international travel – and Secretary 
General Sharma is a man in his 70’s. 
 
HC: That’s right, but age should not be necessarily a handicap. 
 
SO: He’s also battling, as you say, the whole new neo-liberal management 
structure and delivery of efficiencies. He is expected to be the CEO of 
the Secretariat, as well as trying to respond to states who have ever-
increasing demands, but with a Secretariat that has ever-decreasing 
resources. 
 
HC: Yes, that’s right, exactly. But, there’s a couple of interesting stories here. 
Despite the fact that the Australians thought that Fraser would win the SG 
job, I always counselled them against that, knowing Emeka’s style and huge 
reputation in the Commonwealth. 
 
SO: Well, Emeka was an African too. With African votes. 
 
HC: Since his day one in the Secretariat, Emeka had been genuinely and carefully 
cultivating his contacts – in the Commonwealth’s spirit of friendship, taking a 
personal interest in Commonwealth people, following them up in their 
capitals, intervening for their countries where he could, taking them out for 
breakfast, lunch and dinner over many years. People who were third 
secretaries back in those early days – in New York or London – were now 
running foreign ministries and were foreign ministers themselves. He had an 
inside running. He also had very heavy support from the Nigerian government 
and the time had come for the appointment of an African. So he beat Fraser 
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and I wasn’t surprised, but others were surprised and disappointed. I think 
that the role demands a particular energy, a particular incisiveness and 




HC: I’d like to talk to you about that off the record as well. 
 
SO: Lastly, the role and value of the head of the Commonwealth. 
 
HC: Well, yes, we now have knights and dames reinstituted here in Australia, as 
you have probably gathered! The Queen’s role in Australia is obviously 
contentious and people hold views passionately one way or the other. But in 
terms of the Commonwealth, I don’t think anyone disputes that she’s been a 
binding force and an exemplary Head. It’s unfortunate that the Monarch is 
being pressed into a latter day role in the Commonwealth that she didn’t have 
in the early days. I think it was in Edinburgh in ’97… 
 
SO: That she started to make her opening address. 
 
HC: Yes, that’s right, yeah. 
 




SO: Which I found interesting. 
 
HC: Well, yes. I think it was a remarkably Emeka/Tony Blair sort of thing to do. 
Tony Blair, probably, because it was the 50th anniversary [of] the coronation 
and a special anniversary for the UK and the CHOGM in Edinburgh. 
 




 And Chief Emeka, because he’s a confirmed monarchist and great 
respecter of the Queen. 
 
HC: Yes, absolutely. There was also the introduction of the Commonwealth Mace, 
symbolic of the formalism and a role for the monarchy. It brought HM out of 
the wings on to centre stage and introduced her to an upfront role in Heads of 
Government meetings. I’m sure there were some good aspects to all of that, 
but it certainly changes the role of standing by and being there in an advisory 
capacity. 
 
SO: How far do you think it gives an unfortunate impression that this is still 
the British Commonwealth? 
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HC: Well, I think it does. Yes, it does, certainly in the minds of the general public. 
Here in Australia if people think about the Commonwealth they think about 
two things, basically, both of which involve the Queen very closely or the 
royal family. One is the CHOGM, and the other [is] the Commonwealth 
Games, in which the Royal Family has an important role to play. I don’t think 
this upfront role needed to be replicated at the CHOGM.   
 
SO: What about the future of the headship, after she finally goes? 
 
HC: Well, I think she is a hard act to follow, and I’m sure the succession has the 
Commonwealth in very high regard. 
 
SO: Derek Ingram argued thirty years ago and still is very firmly of this view 
that the Commonwealth doesn’t need a formal head – that it’s grown up 
enough to do away with such an institution. 
 
HC: Yeah, probably. A lot of the anti-monarchist people in Australia would go 
along with that. I happen to think that it’s not a bad thing. There’s been a 
contest in the Canberra context of people who want to drop ‘Royal’ from the 
Commonwealth Society, and, as you know, it’s been done in other places. 
But others have argued that having the Royal brand is a very desirable plus; 
the Royal Lifesaving Association, etc. 
 
SO: So, it gives it a distinction? 
 
HC: It does, yes, and that’s worth millions, people say. 
 
SO: Well, it’s a view! Hugh, thank you very much indeed for a fascinating 
interview. 
 
HC: I hope it has been helpful. 
 
SO: It’s been more than helpful. Thank you so much. 
 
 
[END OF AUDIOFILE PART TWO] 
 
 
 
